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ABSTRACT

The problem of this thesis is to determine Mill's understanding
of the concept of liberty, end the type of contemporary criticism it
received. A consideration of the formation of the concept through the
education of Mill, and of the influences exerted on him, helped to
explain to some extent the reason why he produced the Interpretation
of liberty that he exposed. Bis definition of liberty consisted of
three points or elements that were eventually reduced to two basic
principlesj the first claims for the individual complete freedom of
thought, speech, and action; the second concedes to society the
rights to limit the freedom of the individual only in the name of
the liberties of the other individuals who make up society.
In the majority of cases, M s critics attacked Mill's theory
of knowledge in order to weaken the position of M s doctrine of liberty.
Since he would not accept their belief in objective, immutable truth,
or recognise an objective norm of morality, M s doctrine was branded
as no more than an opinion, which was only valid for its author.

In

the practical order, M s ideas enjoyed some measure of success in
affecting government changes and in attaining a number of reforms in
relation to Individual and social freedoms.
Mill assumed that every man is a law unto himself, and that
his freedom was absolute, ^hat he failed to see was that the end of
man was perfect liberty in (Sod. The role of Society is to aid man in
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Attaining hia and by placing laws about hla human, and therefore
defective, nature. Thase laws are based on the diwine law, both
natural and revealed, and are interpreted in the social order for the
good of the Individual.
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I
THE FORMATION OF J.S. MILL'S DOCTRINE OF LIBESTI

It nay be said feat Jbhn Stuart Mill was carefully prepared for
his role in English thought in the nineteenth century*

In order that the

younger Mill would be prepared to carry on the Utilitarian tradition,
James Mill, with the encouragement of his close friend JCreqy Bentham,
undertook the strange experiment feat was his son's education*

This in**

Structtlon began when the boy was only two years of age, and prominent in
fee course were the Ideals of liberty, freedom, and democracy* It is not
necessary to give in detail fee list of ancient classical, philosophical,
and historical authors and works which John Mill mastered as a boy*

It

will be sufficient to say feat a very wide reading in these subjects, as
well as in English Literature, and an intense training in Latin, Greek,
and Mathematics under fee direction of his father and Bentham, all con**
stituted a most unique type of education completed at a very early age*
Among fee many books feat he read may be found the following
works which contributed to his early consideration of libertyt Moshsia's
Ecclesiastical History, M'Crie's Knox, and two histories of the Quakers*
Mil's comment regarding this aspect of his education is as followsi
I have mentioned at how early an age he made me a reader of
eeeleaiaatieal history! and he taught me to take the strong
est interest in the Reformation, as the great and decisive
contest against priestly tyranny for liberty of thought*-**

*John Stuart Mill, Autobiography (New Xorkt Columbia U. Press,
192b) p* 21, Preface by Johnmi,® & b B o s s ,

1
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James Hill was forming what was to be on© of his son's greatest Intel*
lectual interests, the description and defense of liberty*

and the younger

Mill was not yet eight years old*
During a part of this period, from 181U to 181?, there was another
influence on the formulation of Mill* s utilitarian thought*

Jhreay

Bentham took up residence, in the summers, at Fort Abbey in Somersetshire,
and the younger Hill spent many of his leisure hours with him, thus re*
oelving a direct influence in the principle of iftilltarlaalsm that had
net formerly been present*
It was in this same period that he was introduced to the work of
Malthus and Rioardo, and to his father's theories of political economy*
In respect to this part of his education, a contemporary remarks*
We must remember, however, that while his father could
not be expected to teach him everything, yet, in point
of fact, there were a few things that he could and did
teach effectually! one of these was Logic* the others
were Political Bbonosy, Historical Philosophy and Politics, all which were eminently his own subjects*
Mill himself speaks of this aspect of his education in glowing terns,
"I do not believe that any scientific teaching ever wae more thorough,
or better fitted for training the faculties, than the node in which
logic and political econony were taught to me by ay father."2 In this
connection, the essay by Hobbes, Coagmtatlo Sirs Logics* was highly
esteemed by M U X senior, but his son thought little of it*

Jbhn Mill

was, however, absorbing the ideas that were to form his philosophical

^Alexander Bain, Jbhn Stuart Hill (London* Longman's Green,
it Co*, 1882) p* 26*

2Jbhn Stuart Hill, Autobiography* p* 20*
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views and mike him a leading force to English political and ethical
ideas*

It nay be said then, that tola education gam Mat the combined

Ideas of < t a w Bentham, Janee MIH, Bicardo, and ffelthns* He received
the principle# of utility mainly fxm his father who had taken them
ever and made them into a political foreef tentoan himself had not been
capable of perfowing toe cork of application and dames Hill was toe
type needed £or the exploitation of his ideas*

But toe younger Mill mas

still far from a complete appreciation of toe doctrine as Bentham had
fonsOated it) toe cork of formation mas, however, progressing steadily*
Two visits to franco, the first to IfiSO and the second to 1830,
brought him face to toes, to a dramatic way, with toe rereluitonary
were current on the O n t U
sent*
During the first of these visits, from the fifteenth of May,
1080, until July of 1821, Mill stayed with the family of f»lr Samuel
Benthos, the brother of Jeremy Bentham* During his stay, he read and
wrote French frenaledly, so as to learn the language as eptokly and
perfectly as pesetolei and chief among

ware those of

Voltaire, The coneecusnt familiarity with the French language and
literature gave rise to a new interest and a better grasp of the poli
tics and social oondRtlons of that country* After his return to England,
he leapt in constant touch with toe publications and protOem# of the
Gcnttoent, and he reed this bax&ground to keep M s countrymen informed
concernto^ toe cewaediiy they <ftd not possess, liberty of thought, ere
pression, and todlvtorelity* Disregarding all of the educational aide

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

h
he experienced at this tin®. Mill believed that*
it® greatest, perhaps, of the many advantages which I
m m to this episode in ray education, was that of hav
ing breathed for a whole year, the free and genial
life of Continental atmosphere. This advantage was
not the lose real thought I could not then estimate,
nor even consciously feel it*1
Mill was fully eamdneed that freedom of any kind hardly existed in his
own country, and he believed that liberty* in its true sense, was a
monopoly held by the Continent, and particularly by France,
During this visit to France, he became acqiainted with M, Say,2
/

whom he describee in M s Autobiography as ^enlightened,* and *a fine
specimen of the best kind of French Republican,*3 who would not bow to
Bonaparte, but demanded the liberty of the Republic that was based on
the rights of the individual* K# Say was familiar with the leaders of
the Liberal party and he introduced Mill to many of these men and their
ideas* One of the outstanding personages h© met was Saint-Simon who
was then considered a clever original, although he had not yet formulated
a new philosophy*

the main influence that Mill received from this group,

and frora feds association with then, was, as fee himself states i
A strong and permanent interest in Cosstinmtal Idberalisn, of which I ever afterwards kept ayself su courant.

%bid*, pp« Uo4il,
2«Iean Baptists Say was a French economist whose Traits
d *Econc«iie PoHtl qae roused the French govemraent againsOBSTin 1803*
£i a reamt o# 'ms later' works, Da l'Analetsrre at dee Anglais and a
revised edit!cm of his Traits* 1» waoap;oin^d t o a pro/ossorahip in
industrial economy at
'Boneervatoire des Arts et Metiers in 18&5>*
In 1831 he become professo*. of political economy at the College de France*
3j©fen Stuart Mill, AutobioEraohy. p* U2*
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as much Aa.of English politics* a thing not at all
usual in iSlse days with Englishmen, and which had
a very salutary Influence on ay development, keeping as free from tha error always prevalent in
England, and from which even my father with all his
superiority to prejudice was not exempt, of judging
universal questions by a merely English standard*4
Mill returned to England the following year and began to read Roman law
with Mr. Austin after his father decided that he should become a lawyer*
As an accompaniment to this work, dames Mill gave his son the Traits de
Legislation by Dumont* This was an interpretation of the principle
speculation of Bentham, and Mill calls the incident a turning point in
his mental history* He now believed that he understood the principle
of utility as Bentham intended that it should be understood* The three
volumes of the Traits caused all of his pre-eonoelved, but Confused and
unistegrated, ideas to fall into place around the principle of utility,
• "as the keystone which held together the detached and fragmentary com
ponent parts of my knowledge and beliefs* Zt gave unity to my conceptions
1
of things*1,2 ‘This was the moment of the coalescence of his philosophy
that was so thoroughly ingrained fcy the time he realised its presence
that when later he disapproved of many of its parts, he could not find
it within his power to break with it completely. His reading for this
year also included a history of the French Bevolution, in which topic
he became thoroughly versed in succeeding years*
In the vidtite of the year of 1822-23 the Utilitarian Society
was formed and inaugurated in the house of JCremy Bentham*

Zt was

1|bid., p. 13*
2Xbld*. p. 1*7.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

6
couponed of young men professing utility as their standard in ethics and
polities, and who desired to discuss questions relating to that princi
ple* A number of M t H '8 earlier Ideas received their flail formulation
in the society discussions*
'In the summer of 1013 m i l wrote his first argumentative essay
which was published in the traveller and which he said was,«aa attack
on what X regarded as the aristocratic prejudice, that the rich were,
/
or were likely to be, superior in moral qualities to the poor*"1 Mean*.
while he contributed letters and articles to the Morning Chronicle*
Also during this year} the Ttestminater Beview was proposed by Bentham
as an organ for the Philosophic Radicals so that they might bring their
opinions before the public as freely as they desired. Mill states that
the problem they faced was that!
Freedom of discussion even in polities, much more in
religion, was at that time far from being, even in
theory, the conceded point which it at least seems
to be nowj and the holders of obnoxious opinions had
to be always reatfy to argue and redargue for the
liberty of expressing them*2 1
'The question of freedom of speech was a familiar one to Mill and his
contemporaries at this point, for their opinions were considered revoV

lutlonary and something to be smothered before they became widespread*
In March of 182h the first number of the Westminster Bevlcw was
published, and between 1821* end 182? John MB.il contributed hirteen

articles to it* These were reviews of books on histozy and political

1Ibid*, p* 50*
2Ibid*, p. 61*
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economy, and discussions on special political topics such as the corn
Ians* the game laws, and the laws of libel. On© of these early articles
is particularly important to this discussion} it is, “The first article
in the third number (July, l82lt) is on the Csrlile Persecutions, and, I
have no doubt, is hls.w^ This particular piece of work is his first
published expression referring directly to his opinions on liberty and
freedom of speech and thought*
In later years in his Autobiography. Mill gives a specific
summary of this period of his life and the battle which he was waging,
in company with the Philosophic Uadioals, through the Westminster
Beview in favour of freedoms
/ At this period, when liberalism seemed to be becoming
the tone of the time. when iworovement of institutions
was preached from the highest places, and a complete
change of the eonSHLtution of Parliament was loudly
demanded in the lowest, it is not strange that attention
should have been roused by the regular appearance in
controversy of what seemed a new school of writer*,
claiming to be the legislators and theorists of this
new tendency, the air of strong conviction with which
they wrote, when ^scarcely any one else seemed to have
an equally strong faith in as definite a creed} the
boldness with which they tilted against the very front
of both the existing political parties} their uncom
promising profession of opposition to many of the
generally received opinions, and the suspicion they
lay under of holding others still more heterodox
than they professed} the talent and verve of at least
ay father* s articles, and the appearance of a corps
behind him sufficient to carry oh a review} and
finally, the fact that the review was bought and

Stuart Mill, p. 33* Hehard Oarlile was
an admirer of Jeremy Benl&am and' a f^otbinker with a propensity for
getting himself into trouble. When the Black Dwarf, a weekly London
publication, was banned as obnoxious literature, CarlUe proceeded to
sell copies of it in secret, The editor of the paper, Steill, was
arrested and Carlile cane into prominence when he offered to take the
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road, made tho so-called Bentham school in Philosophy
and politico fill a greater place in the public mind
than it had held before, or haa ever again held since
other equally earnest schools of thought have arisen
in England.1 '
This statement of the situation indicates definitely the place of Hill
and his contemporaries in the early nineteenth century political arena
as the champions of the new liberalism; they were at first the only
men groped together for the specific purpose of defying the govern
ment and demanding the common liberties in economics, politics, and
i
society.
In 1825 Hill edited Bentham* a book on Evidence, and founded the
Speculative Debating Society. And in the following year the Utilitarian
gro'<g> broke up. These were ccmonplace activities in KUl*s buey life,
but beneath it all an intellectual struggle was forming. There arose
in his mind a doubt as to the value of the ends which he had set up
for himself under the guidance of his father. He had reached a point
of mental saturation which was coupled with a physical break down, as
indicated by hie friend Bain, “the dejection so feelingly depicted was

editoris place in the interests of freedom of the press. When he was
refused this honour, he edited political parodies at a great rate until
M s arrest in 181?. When acquitted, he carried on his crusade, and by
the end of October of 181£ he had six indictments against him. Event**
ally his family and friends were being arrested regularly for attempting
to defend the freedom of the press. Oarlile thus attained notoriety as
a protector of free spedch and individual rights. His efforts are on a
par with the French Itevolution of 1830 as factors in the extension of
free speech rights In England.
^•fohn Stuart Mill, Autobiography, p. 70.
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due to physical causes, and that the chief of thews causes was over
working the b r a i n * A t this tine, Hill expezlenced a great feeling of
dejection and listleesnsss in which he could not enjoy any type of recrea
tion, pleasure, or rest#
In this frame of mind it occurred to m to put "the
question directly to ayaelf * “Suppose that all your
objects in life were realised; that all the changes
in institutions and opinions which you are looking
forward to, could be completely effected at this
instant! would this be a great joy and happiness to
you?* And an Irrepressible self-consciousness
distinctly answered, “Hot * At that ny heart sank
within me; the whole foundation on which ny life
was constructed fell down*”
this was the beginning of the intellectual break with the form of Utili
tarianism proposed by his father and Jsreny Bentham* Mill realised that
he could not turn to his father for help, since Junes Mill had conducted
his sonfs education on the basis of that principle that the younger
Mill now questioned* He understood that his problem was beyond tie
power of any remedy his father might propose* Too, since all of his
friends were steeped in the very tradition that he was forsaking, he
haul no one idiom he could consult* It now seemed to Mill that regard for
the public good was too vague an end for the satisfaction of man*s needs*
He m w that there was some element lacking in the strict principle of
utility, that if the needed referas in society and government were effect
ed, and freedom was extended to all in the community so that each indi
vidual achieved a state of physical comfort, “the pleasures of life,

•^Bain, Jaha Stuart Mill* p* 38*
g
«fehn Stuart Mill, Autobiography* p* 9k*
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being no longer kept up by struggle and privation, would cease to be
pleasures."I

At first he had no idea where to look for the solution

of his problem.

It was quite by accident that he was led to the answer

in the recognition of emotion as a necessary part of a happy life and a
balanced mentality.

He had been raised by his father in the Platonic

tradition of th© condemnation of poetry as a waste of intellectual ener
gy and a source of unnecessary and misleading feelings*
In this state of disillusionment, Mill chanced to pick up a
copy of Wordsworth1s poetry and he read it as a possible source of recre
ation) in it he apparently found the answer to hie problemj his mind was
opened to new ideas from all quarters.

The choice of Wordsworth, out of

all the English poets whom he might have read, suggests a certain af
finity between Mill's mind, as -earlier influenced by french literature,
and the philosophy of Wordsworth with its emphasis on the importance of
th© individual, which also had a french background*

He discovered in

the poems, descriptions of feelings that he had experienced but could
not explain, or admitj h© realized that he had discovered a, "source of
inward joy, of sympathetic and imaginative pleasure, which could be
shared in by all human beings*"^

This pleasure that could be equally

shared by all had no connection however with the struggle or imperfections
of society) it would be the source of inward happiness that remained
when all of the evil® of society were remedied.

This was the basis for

^Ibld,» p. 102,
2Xbfd*. p. 10h,
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tin creation of a new IMlltarianiam which Hill held, and defended, for*
the remainder of his life* It m e a utility that admitted beauty, feel
ing, virtue, end ultimately, a U n i of Deis*.
Hill gradually emerged frem this aental oriels end never experi
enced the proven again, but he continued to read the works of Wordsworth
in appreciation for what they had done for bin* He turned M s studies
now to Coleridge, Goethe, and Carlyle) and he found mush in the theories
of the Soint-Simonions, who wore beginning to exsri their influence in
France2’, and in Auguste Cents* From these authors he received hie first
reaction in the direction of Saddles.

His view of hvsanity was great

ly broadened, he delighted in poetry for the soke of poetry, his contro
versial attitude beease sore placable, and he acquired a hatred for
seetazlaaisn.

Xn the fallowing years, Hill continued to contribute to

the periodicals while putting the finishing touches on M s revamped phi
losophy.

In 1828 he became interested in the problem of FMlosophioal

necessity and he worked out the solution that he eventually included in
the Logic. The year 182? witnessed his withdrawal from the Speculative
Debating Society so that he could cany on M s studies privately and
to moke premature statements regarding his results*

^"Thelr criticisms on the common doctrines of liberalism seemed
to me full Of important truth) and it was partly by their writings that
ay eyes were opened to the very limited c m temporary value of the old
political eoonosy, which assumes private property and inheritance os
indefeasible facts, and freedom of production and exchange as the
dernier wot of social Improvement.” Ibid., p. 117.
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la 1831 Mill met r«* Harriet ?5ardy Taylorf this friendship did
not calnimte in marriage for twenty years, until V* Taylor died, bat
it influenced M m to such an extent that the marriage ie considered the
third ami final phase of M e life*

This w a a influenced M e thought.

M e node of expreeel on. M e tendencies, and, in particular, the for
mation and production of the eeeey On liberty and ite companion pieces*
In 183$, Sir Lilian MaEUmorth founded the Lcadont shortly
afterwards hi bought the l^etMnBter
Berleif and united the two publim eaM M eM M neew iieaM M n e iM H R iM i
*

cations with Mill ee editor* Eventually Fill bought the paper himself*
rM l e he m s editing the London and W»stajaetcr lesion* he also wrote
arttdoe in the gaoeainer on French polities, having became inflamed
with the subject haring hie 1830 visit to the Continent after the July
Eevolution* Q m of the chief aims of the Beview was the propagation of
the ideas of the Philosophic itadicale, but its editor accepted articles
written by representatives of the opposing schools of thought In tbs
interests of liberal progress*
'hiring M s lifetime, M U ! produced the major works which follow
in their chronological order* la tbs jesrs I83O and I83I dll wrote the
five essays which were later published aider the title of Essays on
T o m 'foeettled Oiest’ons of Political

The year lQ4i saw the

publication of the System of Logic* which is an erpdLrieal view of logic
based an M e father1® psychology, and '’our year# later the Prinelpios
of Political Kecatamr speared*

T-jo years after M s marriage In 1851,

“ill produced The SnfirancMaeasnt of Women in which nay be recognised
the combination of i''ca® of liberty and feminism, a special evidence of
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the influence of Harriet Saylor Hill# M U aaid later that he always
had the principle in M u d but it was aim who formulated it and anooureged
Itia to write tide ideas down#

in 1356 Mars# Hill died, and in tribute .to

her m m r y he published tii» essay On liberty as it then stood, although

they had been marking on it together and had intended to revise it onoe
store during the winter of 1353* Between 1359 and 1375 ho wrote the
aeries that eventually appeared as Blasertations and ^laeuasioas# and in
and in 1361 the ConaldeieUoae on aepresentative Oaernaent was put into
print#

In 1363 the Utilitarianism cans out* it was the new system he had

foxuulated and it tends to weaken rather than strengthen the general view
on utility# It is the Isasi convincing of his works since he makes so
assy changes that th«#re is little left of the original creed*

In the

year 1865 he finished An ..Jtaa&aation of Sir Willis* BeaHton** .’Mloaophy
and Augusts Coats and aMriLtlvl3a» is this saae year Hill m s eleoted to
3erllaa»nt from Westadnster and he went forward to champion his views and
those of the Philosophic Radicals until 1368* After his retirement from
Parliament, he finished tie Subjection of Women* He died in 1373* and
after his death the Autobiography and three Essays on Cliaion were pub
lished*
la the ensuing axasiaatiens of Hill's wort* with a view to
arriving at a definite notion of what he meant by "liberty? it has been
.naoeeaary to linlt the area of study to oertain phases of his literary
•n.viuies and to certain publications and periodicals considered to be
representative of his thought*

The examination WL11 begin, thexefore,

with Ids earliest published ideas on the problsn.
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HILL’S WRITINGS CONCERNING LIBERTX
M i l began writing on the problem of freedom as early as 1321;
in his first articles in the Westminster %ylsw«

The first essay to be

considered is that on religious prosecution, in relation to the Oarlile
Persecutions mentioned above*

This essay appeared in the third number

under the title of On the Recent Perseoutions of Persons Vending Books
Against Christianity* An Address to Deists, by a Dissenter*

The work

is a rather prolonged recapitulation of the situation under consideration
and a listing of those involved, with appropriate remarks as to why they
are considered part of the argument*

The first point of note is his

declaration that there is no infallible authority to decide in such
cases of disagreement of opinion*

This principle is used consistently

by Mill in aimport of the right of freedom of discussion*

In this par

ticular case he applies it to religion since certain persons were being
prosecuted for denying adherence to what was considered by many to be
the State Religion of England* And even further, it was considered a
crime to deny belief in God*

But Mill defended what he considered an

inherent right to disagree with customary beliefs when he sayst
The existing religion of any country either is, or
is not, susceptible of improvement* If the former,
allowing it to be the province of the government
to decide what is an improvement, and how it should

111
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be made, the freest discussion of its snerlts should
be authorised as the best mode of fhraishlng mater
ials for a reformation.1
It will be apparent as the paper proceeds that he co ild not see a consistent middle position ill this problem* or m y problem in any way in
volving freedom of the Individual or of grotqpsf either there must be
absolute freedom of discussion or there mas despotism, fie Indicated too
that if people sere repaired by Iasi to adhere to a belief* there would
result an hypocrisy that would be a greater evil than nonwconltormity#
"The evened unbeliever may become a bad many the hypocrite is a bad
man.** Over and o*mr In this paper Mill points out the necessity of
allowing discussion in order to progress and this is M s main argument
in favour of the publishers of the heretleal booksy if Christianity is
string enough and true to Itself it need not fear uest^on or argument.
The paper ends with the plea* wfcr e<-ual justice to believer and un
believer-* so that the government may not* ttadd to the misfortune of
Infidelity the privation of civil rights* and the endurance of legal
ponalties*ff3
If an attempt were made to outline the principles wldch emerge
~>oa this first essay on the -uestion

f liberty of dlscuaaion it might

be oald that in the first .place there is no infallible authority to which

%stmtns ter P-eview** (London* Baldwin, Pradoek ond .Toy, 1C?U)

n * p. 3.
?Ibid., p. !»*
3lbld.. p. P7.
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disagreements of opinion nay be subedited} secondly, if the gomrwienfc
attempts to enforce it# vines the result is a greater erll, for there is
no riddle way b e t m m absolute freedom of discussion and the tyranny of
lav* Finally* the only hope of progress in hanan affairs is provided by
absolute freedom of discussion*
The m x t najor essay concerning the problem of r! ghts appeared
la the 'featnjnster Revieu of April iBflSf under the title Ob the lew of
Ubel and freedom of the Press# She article begins with this striking
obeervaticoi
Tbs lav of Inland is as vmfavouraKLe to the liberty of
the press* as that of the » s t teepotic govermcnt
which has over existed} and* oonae<?iently****what over
degree of that liberty is enjoyed in this country*
exists, not in conse nance ~f the low, but in spite
of it.*
And continuing m this these* he charges the government with being tyran
nical in its suppression not of falsehood but of true and important
opinions, thereby protecting its own position at the expense of the
rights of individuals t
But there are nary subjects, and these the m e t important
of all* on which it is the Interest of the jovcrraent*
not that the people shosld think right but* on the contra
ry, that they should thinkwongi on these subjects, there
fore* the govemnefxt is cults sure* If it has the power*
to suppress, riot the false and rdeohlcvous opinions but
the peat and lmortant truths*2
Bore .111 represents a great body of revolutionary ideas - which 0. K.
Chesterton claim m s sufficient to ham brought about a revolution In

i^estnliMter Review®* III, p*?86*
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England comparable to, "those of France - had not the revolution of the
poor against the rich been foiled by a revolution of the rich against
the poor."*
In the article Mill indicates the dangers which ensue from
government control of thought through libel laws and control of the press*
Once again, the question arises as to who will be the judge, the infalli
ble arbiter, of what is good and what is bad*

Here he emphatically states

what was assumed in the former article, that there can be no line of
demarcation, "to decide what opinions shall be permitted, and what pro
hibited*

To make this llna, he says, would be to choose the opinions

that the people are to hold, and like the religious views mentioned
above, the choice of all opinion is a right of the individual to be
enjoyed in full*

And again he repeats and makes clear, "there is no

medium between perfect freedom of expressing opinions, and absolute
despotism**3

This conviction is the source of a great deal of his

difficulty, for if Mill had been able to see a sort of via media between
these two extremes, he might have been able to clear up some of the
difficulties which caused confusion in his writings and distress in his
own mind as to the manner of resolving the opposition between liberty
and authority.

In this essay he appeals to public opinion as the chief

■*tl* K* Chesterton, The Victorian Age in literature, 12th ed*
(London* Thornton Btttterworik Ltd*, 1^31 ), p. Id*
S. Mill, "Westminster Review," 11, p, 289*

3Ibid«, pp. 289- 290*
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m&xus through which freedom of discussion may bo gained* And again ho
repeats the principle that free discussion is the instruoont of pro
gress, that, "under a free system, if error would be promulgated, so
would truthi and truth never fails, in the long run, to prevail over
eiror*"* He dleoueees the intoleraaoe and despotism of the aneient
rulers before a constitution was in force, and points out that the
reason them unconstitutional rulers nuasled the press was that they be
lieved that the
ignorance.

combos

man Is unable to fore correct opinions because of

Thaihe states that the ignorance itself is due to the lack of

free discussion, "Discussion, therefore, has a necessary tendency to
rowdy its own evils."2

The false opinions that .make their appearance

must be tolerated for the sake of truth since, he repeats, it is impossible to draw the line between true and false opinions! the problem
must work itself out over a period of time and the truth will neces
sarily win out*

The rest of the essay deals with the use of invective

in argument, the prohibition of which limits free speech*

The general

idea is that anything which in any way restricts the absolute liberty
of the press is reducible to the evil of choosing opinions for the
people to hold under duress* After a discussion of law he svbm up»
The two following conclusions may now, we thinly be
regarded as fully established! that the law of Kngland,
as delivered by its authorised interpreters, the judges,
however earnestly the same judges may occasionally

htod., p. 2?1*

Ibid., p. 2p2>.
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disavow this doctrine, prohibits all unfavourable
representation with respect to institutions, and
with respect to government and its actst
And, consequently, that If aqjr freedom of dis
cussion is permitted to exist, It is only because
it cannot be repressed! the reason why it cannot be repressed, being, the dread of public opinion*
Thus, free discussion concerns everyone in the community and it is the
duty of every non, as an individual, to see that the right is maintained
and used properly*
Zt say be concluded, therefore, that the principles outlined in
this essay areJ first, the government is suppressing truths that may be
hurtful to itself by auasllng the press and misapplying the laws of
llbelj second, there is no intermediate position between absolute
freedom and absolute tyranny in setters of expression! last, public
opinion is the instrument through which freedom of discussion is to be
attained and maintained.
The chief importance of the Sjyetea of logic with reference to
this research lies in the fact that whereas Necessity and Freedom, as
philosophic notions, are usually considered as contradictories,
characteristically Hill resolves the contradiction by a modified in
terpretation of Necessity.

Hence he saysi

Correctly conceived, the doctrine called philosophical
Necessity is simply thisi that, given the actives which
are present to the individual's mind, and given like
wise the character and disposition of tha individual,
the manner in which he will act might be unerringly in
ferred} that if we knew the person thoroughly, and knew
all the inducements which are acting upon him, we could

1Ibid., pp. 320-321.
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control hlo fate in a proper manner and any unnatural interference with
tlxis freedom, and the development of virtue,

is therefore a despotism

reigning over his very moral nature*
The free-will doctrine, by keeping in view precisely that
portion of the truth which the word Necessity put* out of
sight, namely, the power of the mind to co-operate in the
formation of its own character, has given to ite adherents
a practical feeling much nearer to the truth than has
generally (X believe) existed in the minds of necessitarians*
The latter may have had a stronger sense of the importance
of what human beings can do to shape the characters of one
another, but the free-will doctrine has, I believe, foster
ed in its supporters a much stronger spirit of self-culture.*
The fares discussion of problems tends to produce the truths men live by,
and if they are to shape their lives in the way of virtue, as free men,
they must be allowed to pursue these truths.

Any restriction of liberty

results in a restriction of virtue and the production of a morally
stunted people*
In this article M U

sets out to reconcile the antinomy which

exists between freedom and necessity.

He achieves this by saying that

if wo know all the factors which bear upon a free decision we would
realize that the man could not decide otherwise than he does, which is
to say that free decisions are necessitated and determined*

JMs con

clusion finds its place in his argument for freedom through his plea for
the free discussion of all problems as providing the factors which de
termine the decisions.

These decisions may be true or false, but ne has

professed his faith in the principle veritaa prevalebit* hence free dis
cussion of all opinions untrameled by any legislation or control by

^bid., p. 551*

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

22

authority is toe only forsula through * M c h truth nay be Obtained*
Thl® process which lie proposes for the dbtainnsnt of truth in hanan
affairs is .Justified in s systsn of logic* the purpose of which is to
provide m n with a mthod t attaining truth*
The next and indeed the najor contribution which 1*411 m d e to
this toctrine is Ids Itaous and classical essay Oft liberty* which ap
peared in lflj29, although it m i written earlier end revised at least
twice prior to publication*

In fact* he and his wife had planned a

third revision and it would appear that the esxtrw m concern and effort
expended on this treatise* is an indication of the importance with which
its author isrested it*
The essay On Liberty opes* with inference to the distinction
nade in the logic cootssmlng the doctrine of Thiloeophlcal necessity*
The first sentence is* "The subject of this essay is m t toe so-called
liberty of the H U l * so unfortunately opposed to the satonwed doctrine
of PMlosophlcal ’feoessltyj but Civil* or Social IAberty|"* the ns»
ceeeity of free*® is induced Sem past evidence* so what is luft to
distinguish tor© 1®* hi says* "the nature snd Units of the power which
can be legitimately exerciced by society over the individual*"^

"fere

tto issue is between the opposing principles of freedom and authority*
Tto liberty is the final statement of Kill1® Ideas on the subject*

S* ill* utilitarianism* liberty* and Pcoreeonlatlve tovemrwnt (Londont J* H# ^j^^'Tirwr' do*‘*
!3^>)"* p• £>!>•
2Ibid„ p. m *
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It Is not long in the essay before he repeats the complaint against the
present government that has been encountered previously in the earlier
works considered. He claims that the stock phrases concerning the
freedom of the people and their association with their* "democratic
government” do not indicate the true state of affairsj that, "the people
who exercise the power are not always the same people with those over
whoa it is exercised} and the self-government spoken of is not the
government of each lay himself, but of each by all the rest*"*

There is,

again, the implication that freedom exists in spite of the laws of the
country and persists

only through the strength of public opinion.

Once

more, he mentions the rights of the unbeliever in the religious quarrsl
wherein the statements of the unbeliever eventually advance the cause of
freedom!
The great writers to whoa the world owes what religious
liberty it possesses, have mostly asserted freedom af
conscience as an indefeasible right, and denied absolutely that a human being is accountable to others for
his religious belief* let so natural to mankind is
intolerance in whatever they really care about, that
religious freedom has hardly anywhere been practically
realized, except where religious indifference, which
dislikes to have its peace disturbed by theological
quarrels, has added its weight to the scale.*
Thw whole work revolves around 1his central theme that it is
necessary to consider the negative side to every positive affirmation
and of, "laying down, side by side, with every proposition, the counter-

1
Ibid., p. 67.
2
Ibid., p. 71.
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towards the end af bis iatrodaotoiy portion

state*

Ids intention In ths essay* to assert the principle* "that -the sole end
for which nanSdnd ere warranted, individually os* collectively* in inter
fering

with the lib e rty of action of a w of their araber is self-

psrot@etl<aw,?^ Si the last few pages of the preface are found the utili
tarian ideas be applies in the construction of Ida principle of lib e rty

m an ethical efaesttaa*

**I regard u t ilit y m the u ltlm te appeal on

all ethical rusetionej but it mm% be u t ilit y in die largest sense*

grounded on the pemansat interest® of a nan as a progressive being#"3
In tills statenent is contained tin i p m of f i l l *a whole crusadej that
I
for the 3aim of :lan *3 greatest happiness* which is attained oily through
progress* them oust esdst -a str ict freedom which is the tool of pro press
of thought* w d | and deeds

"The only freedom which teserves the name*

is that of pursuing our a m good in our own way* so long as we do not
attempt to deprive otlwra of tlislrs* or inpeds tlsdr efforts to obtain
il#»k

Freedom consists in the pursuit of good or virtue but -that

freedom is Halted by ram1® obligati on to the other m i i r a of society
wtx3 have- an counl right to attain virtue#
'Hie second chapter Is built around three assumptions*

first*

th at an opinion authtafitatlvwly ©spresseed m s be tm©$ see.vxt# the

3-aiexnnder n.rdn# doha Stuart ,111* p* 10U#
£# f i l l , Cn Liberty# pp# 7?-73#
W d * . P. 1km
^Ibi-i#, p . 75#
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opinion may be false, but he goes on to show the

necessity

of keeping

the opposite view of each opinion before the mind, in order that the
opinion may keep its v lta iity j la s t, appears M ill's favourite theoiy,
that conflicting doctrines usually share the truth between them and,
therefore, each must be examined thoroughly and honestly*
is , therefore, an exposition of the lib e rty of

This chapter

thought and discussion

in which are treated religious freedom and freedom of the press, as w ell
as the rights of criticism and invective.

M ill begim with the prin

c ip le , " If a ll mankind minus one were of one opinion, and only one
person were of the contrary opinion, mankind would be no more ju s ti
fie d in silencing that one person, than he,
be ju s tifie d in silencing mankind."*

if

he had the power, would

This is the statement of the abso

lute right of the individual to hold an opinion, lig h t or wrong, in de
fiance of a l l standards and customs. He bases this idea on the principle
that remains unchanged in a l l his works, that to silence any opinion is
an assumption of in f a llib ilit y , which in its e lf is an e v il equal to that
of suppression of rig h ts.

He repeats again his case against bigotry

and intolerance on the level of human relations and of government,
stressing that, "there is no such thing as absolute certainty *"2 The
theme of progress through freedom of discussion, coupled with that of
the sovereignty of man over his own destiny, reappears in this chapter
in the statement, "The whole strength and value, then, of human

1Ib id ** p. 79.
2Ib id ., p. 81*

57343
r- - - - - • .
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jnd^psnt, depending on the one property, that it can be set right when
It ie wrong, reliance can be placed on It only when the mane of sett*
lag it right are kept constantly at hand*"* The closest approach to
certainty

any opinion, says BUI, is that the opinion has withstood

the trst of its opposite again and Jgaln| and these are the opinions
that m a t be upheld by public support* Continuing trds theme, he says
further that axy opinion which ie eontrary to the truth has no utility
and in tfaty nay truth will triumph hr Its eery usefulness to mankind*
Thors is repeated, too, the attsek;c|tftthoBs who would dictate
what religious beliefs should be held and echoes the thought contained
in the article <u»te<! abww from the Westminster ISevleir* Toftum IX*

lie

says, ftbut I mast be permitted to observe, that it fa not the feeling

sure of a doctrine (be it what it may) which 1 call an assumption of
infallibility*’’? This Is allowable sines a sincere belief Is a right
of the free man as long as the belief Is not forced on to others*

How*

ever, M s objection is to, ’’the undertaking to decide that --uestion for
other*, without allowing them to hear what can be said on t'e contrary
slde*,*3 fie goes m to note that tru th triumphs and advances through
Asoussion, but will not rise above persecution! in fact, it cannot sur
vive a persistent persecution*

This truth that has be&a forcibly put

^tbld*, p* 02*
?Ibld*. p. 85.

%oe.clt*
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down w ill be rediscovered and m y flourish again; only, however, i f I t
ie found in favourable* circumstances of freedom of discussion*

In

treating the second assumption, that the opinion held imy be true, H ill
points out ihat these truths must not bo held as prejudices, independent
of question or investigation, "Truth, thus held, is but one superstition
the more, accidently clinging to the words which enunciate a truth*
The believer must be taught the grounds fo r his b e lie f, and the arguments
against i t must be experienced so that he m y be that much more capable
of defending what he knows to be rig ht*

This state can be attained only

through the free discussion that gives man rational
argument, that tils beliefs are true*

assurance, through

I f free discus si on is absent, the

meaning of the true opinion is lo s t, and, as F ill saysi
The words which convey i t cease to suggest ideas, or
suggest only a small part of those they were originally
employed to communicate* Instead of a vivid conception
and a livin g b e lie f there remain ofcly a few phrases re*
tained by rote; or, i f any p art, the shell and husk
only of the meaning is retained, the fin e r essence being
lo s t *2
Once again, there is the intimation of a liv in g progress, an
inevitable progress, necessarily engendered by free discussion and the
r% ht of tbs individual to agree or disagree with accepted and customary
b elie fs, religious or otherwise*

This theory of progress is tin most

consistent argument fo r lib e rty of thought and discussion, and is the
prevalent one

throughout the whole chapter*

This is backed by logical

Ib id *, p* p6*
2Ib id ., p* 9%
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and u tilita ria n principles drawn from hia other works* Specific exanples
may be found in the following passages.

‘Hue f ir s t , illu s tra te s the

lo g ica l background*
I t is the fashion a t the present tine to disparage
negative logic - that which points cut weaknesses
in theory or errors in practice, without establish
ing positive truths*^
•Hie second illu stra tes M ill*s u tilita ria n bent as applies to this
problem

Each of these nodes of thinking derives its u t ilit y
from the deficiencies of the other) but i t is in a
great measure the opposition of the other that keeps
each within the lim its of reason and sanity* t&less
opinions favourable to democracy and to aristocracy,
to property and to equality, to cooperation and to
competition, to luxury and to abstinence, to so c ia lity
and in d ividu ality, to lib e rty and discipline, and a l l
the other standing antagonisms of practical lif e , are
expressed with equal freedom, and enforced and de
fended with equal talen t and energy, there is no
chance of both elements obtaining th e ir duet one
scale Is sure to go vpt and the other down**
To these he adds the principle of duty to the State, and the problem of
the lack of perfection of the human mind in its present position on the
path of progress, and points out that the proper combination of these
elements constitutes the answer in the discovery of the freedom and
progress of the individual*

H ill suras up his argument by presenting the ground on which
freedom of expression and opinion must be based as follows*

f ir s t , to

^Ib ld , , p. 101*.
2Ib id *, p. 10?.
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dftzgr free expression Is to assume the right of in f a llib ility ; second,
the suppressed opinions may be p a rtia lly true and by being opposed to
the common opinion m y add to tbs fund of truth; third* a true opinion
must be open to discussion to avoid prejudice and to keep the opinions
v ita l in the minds of the believers*

H ill finishes o ff Hie chapter by-

repeating the right to invective as outlined in his a rtic le in the
Westminister Beview*
the following chapter deals with the lib e rty of the Individual
sc ting* which is considered by M ill as one of the major elements of
well-being*

I t opens with a qualification, *Ifo one pretends that

actions should be as free as opinions.*1^ Is believes that opinions
held privately or expressed in the press* regardless of how vituper
ative they my be* are not punishable, but only incur punishment or
suppression when they induce acts that infringe on the rights of other
individuals*

He adds* too* th at i f a mani

Refrains from molesting others in what concerns them,
and merely acts according to his own inclinations and
judgment in things which concern himself* the same
reasons which show that opinion should be free* prove
also that he should be -allowed, without molestation,
to carry his opinions into practice a t his own cost*?
IHn m y pursue Ms opinions freely but he m y not enforce them to the
leant degree on others in M s society*

Hsus lias as much right* according

to M ill* to indulge in various experiments in liv in g as ha lias in
holding diverse opinions* so that he m y progress morally as well as

1Tbid*, p. H I*.
2hoc.cit*
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in te lle c tu a lly .

The only lim it to any accentxicity consists in a regard

fo r the rights of the other individuals in society*

There is f u ll a l

lowance made, in tnis section, fo r that which M ill calh spontaneity,
Which consists in allowing the individual to disagree with customary
procedures on th© basis of his own Interpretation of experience* He
says, specifically*
Nobody denies that people should be so taught and trained
in youth aa to know and benefit by the ascertained re*
suits of human experience* But i t is the privilege and
proper condition ofahuman being,arrived at the s»tu rity of his facu lties, to use andinterpret experience
in hie own way* I t is for him to fin d out what part of
recorded experience is properly applicable to his own
circumstances and character**This last reference to the us® and interpretation of experience implies
that principle established in the Logic* that man controls the fo r*
raation of his own character*

By his interpretation of what happens to

him self, by reapplying the interpretations and altering circumstances,
ha m y grow in virtue and progress to perfection*

The mare conforming

to custom does not develop a^y of the qualities that are distincitve as
those of a human being, and thus, rebellion against accepted norms ia
th® cause of lib erty is the sign of individuality*

In the tone of the

Logic, once again, that man ia the master of his own destiny. M ill
states, "ha who chooses his plan for himself, employs a il his faculties
and these qualities he requires and ajoarolses exactly in proportion as

the part uf his conduct widen ho determines aecoroixig u> his own judg
ment and feelings *"2 The choice, therefore, of the way in which a man

1IM d „ p. 116.
2Ib id ., p. 117.
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w ill conduct his lif e ia an emotional act, which may be strong and
perilous to his fellow members of society i f he does not control i t by
proper judgement*

To be acceptable ia this thesis, the conduct of the

individual lif e must result from a proper balance of desires and Lam

pulses against beliefs and restraints.

In this balance of tested

anotions and opinions, lie s the freedom of ind ividu ality which must bs
defended through continuation or attainment of the lib e rty of thought*
h

•

expression, and discussion!
thus the mind Its e lf is bowed to the yoke! even in what
people do fo r pleasure, conformity is the f ir s t thing
thought of* they lik e in crowds; they exercise choice
only among tin g s commonly donei peculiarity of taste,
eccentricity of conduct, arc shunned equally with
erims si u n til by dint of not following th eir own nature
they have no nature to follows th eir human capacities
are withered and starved! they become incapable of any
strong wishes or native pleasures, and are generally
without eith er opinions or feelings of horns growth,
or properly th eir own**
'Shis is M ill's condemnation of the mediocrity resultant on loosed be
lie fs under the despotism of governmental opinions.
The ind ividu ality of human beings must be encouraged by allowing
them to express themselves in free acts, "within the lim its imposed by
the rights and interests of others*"2 As the individuality is c u lti
vated, the person becomes more valuable to society by becoming more
valuable to himself in progressing to his fu lfillm en t as a well develop
ed person in the p ractical and moral orders.

The further he progresses

XIb id „ p . 11?.
2Ib id ., p. 120.
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the freer he becomes.

Th® atmosphere of

freedom allows genius to ®x»

pand and results in the progress and enrichment of human society#
At this point, and in some respects sim ilar to his reconciliation
of liberty and necessity, fee traditional opposition between Individual
Liberty and Society is minimized and reduced by showing that the greater
degree of non-comfonaity to social custom and authority, even to ths

point of eccentricity, rebounds to the advantage of society# He saysi
In this age, the mere example of non-conformity, the
mere refusal to bend the knee to cuetoe, ie its e lf a
service. Precisely because the tyranny of opinion is
such as to make eccentricity a reproach, i t ia desir
able, in order to break through that tyranny, that
people should be eccentric, Eccentricity has always
abounded when and where strength of character has
abounded} and the amount of eccentricity in a society
has generally been proportional to the amount of
genius, mental vigour, and moral courage i t containsd«
That so few now dare to be eccentric marks the chief
danger of the time#i
This freedom of action is not lim ited to persons of decided mental su
p e rio rity , i t is the lig h t of a ll people to establish the pattern of
th e ir own individual liv e s , and the differences between individuals
requires vast differences in behaviour.

Thus in concluding this

chapter he declares»
Such a re the differences among human beings in th eir
sources of pleasure, th eir susceptibilities of
and the operation on them of d ifferen t physical and
moral agencies, that unless there is a corresponding
d iversity in th e ir modes of life, they neither obtain
their f a ir share of happiness, nor grow up to the

3lb id „ pp. 12L-125.
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mental, moz*al, and aesthetic stature of whicn th eir
nature is capable
lib e rty , therefore, w ill be possible only ia the encouragement of
differences, whatever they may be, just so long as they result in a
marked individuality*

Conformity and custom are the enemies of freedom*

Hence in this discussion concerning the lib e rty of individual
action, M ill arrives a t the following conclusions < the individual ie as
free to act as he is to think, provided his acts do not infringe upon
the rights of others - that is , as long as they are self-regarding actsj
fu rth er, since the only road to truth and virtue is that of experience,
or tlie method of t r ia l and error by which false opinions and wrong lines
of conduct are eliminated, i t is essential to the in tellectu al and
moral progress of tha individual that he be free to perfect himself
through free a c tiv ity .

Thus mediocrity w ill be eliminated by the growth

and toleration of eccentricity, and society w ill benefit by the
emergence of strong characters and personalities! conformity and custom
are not only the enemies of freedom in the individual, they are also
the enemies of th© growth and perfection of society as a whole*
M ill, having in the previous chapter considered the lib e rty of
action from th© point of the individual in society, now considers ths
role of society in lim itin g that lib e rty .

He lays down as a f ir s t

principle that, "Each w ill receive its proper share. . . .To individuality
should belong the part of life in which i t is chiefly the individual

1Ib id ., p . 125.
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that la interested} to society, tha part which chiefly interacts
society
It la at this point that Mill makes a raors exact distinction be*
tween the feelings and conduct of non towards one another.

If a person's

actions merely displease his fellows, he may not be restricted by law
since he incurs his own penalty in the error of his ways.

If, however,

this person infringes on the rules necessary for the protection of the
other members of society, and the consequences of that act fall on other
men, then he must be punished and his liberty restricted!
In the one case, he is an offender at our bar, and we
are called on not only to sit in judgment on him, but,
in one shape or another, to execute our own sentence!
in the other case, it is not our part to inflict any
suffering on him, except what may incidentally follow
from our using ths same liberty in the regulation of
our own affairs, which we allow to him in his.2
When men has reached maturity the society in which he lives can only
blame Itself if that man acts in any way prejudicial to good order be
cause in the formative years of the Individual's youth that society has
had absolute power over him, with ths resultant responsibility of educat
ing him in such a way as to make him capable of rational conduct in his
later years. And too, when society does eventually interfere, "the odds
are that it interferes wrongly, and in the wrong place.>£his inter
ference in personal liberty is usually based on the grounds, and

1Ibid., p. 132.
2Ibld„ p. 136.
3Ibid., p. lhO.
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wrongly so, that the individual ia acting differently from the accepted
standard*
In the last chapter, entitled Applications* MlH attenpta once
again to clarify the two maxims that he combines to form his doctrine of
liberty*
The maxima are, first, that the individual is not
accountable to society for his action, ia so far
as these concern the interests of no person but
himself. Advice, Instruction, persuasion, and
avoidance by other people if thought necessary by
them for their own good, as the only measures
by Which society can Justifiably express its
dislike or disapprobation of his conduct.
Secondly, that for such actions as are prejudicial
to the interests of others, the individual is
accountable, and may be subjected either to social
or to legal punishment, if society is of opinion
that the one or the other is requisite for its
protection,l
Rider these two rules he includes remarks to the effect that society
can interfere in competition only in oases of fraud, treachery, or
force, and that trade must be absolutely free* Any preventative function
allowed to the government is liable to abuse*
The remainder of the essay deals with particularized acts and
oiroumstames, and the conclusions Mill draws from them are listed*
The first of these states that a violation of good manners in public
constitutes an offence against others and may rightly be prohibited.
He next points out that the individual is not free to alienate or for
sake his freedom.

The moral responsibility of a man to his wife and

3lMd., pp. Utf-150.
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children is also indicated and, in conjunction with this, the responsi
bility of ths government in seeing that the children a n properly edu*
eated for the good of society so that the future conclusions they m y
oaks will be useful to society*
All attempts by ths State to bias the conclusions of its
oitizens on disputed subjects are evilj but it may very
properly offer to ascertain and certify that a person
possesses the knowledge requisite to mahe.his conclusions,
on any given subject, worth attending to*
In concluding, Hill lists three objections to any government
interference, even to that interference that does not infringe i$om
personal liberty.

The first of these is that anything done is better

enacted by an individual who has an interest in the task,

Ths second

argument is that If an act is performed by an individual, he contributes
to his own mental progress*

The last reason for limiting governmental

interference is that the greatest check possible must be kept on its
power over individuals.

This would indicate that Hill would have the

governing body act as little as possible in all situations except that
of protection for its subjects.

Finally he expresses his admiration for

ths American form of government which is composed of a free people who
are capable of governing themselves without becoming involved in a
bureaucracy.

Its greatest advantage, he says, lies In ths minute division

of offices and greater extension of the franchise*
Before leaving the essay On Liberty, it will be wall to summa
rize briefly the basic ideas and principles vpon which the entire

XIbld., p. 162,
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treatise is constructed.

It seems self-evident to Mill, although he

rejects self-evident principles as such* that the individual and not
the state is sovereign! that liberty is man's highest attribute, and its
only limitation is self-protection.

Liberty is the condition of pro

gress in knowledge and virtue, and the ultimate criterion of goodness
is utility - utility in its widest meaning based on the permanent in
terests of man as a progressive being. Since there exists no infallible
arbiter of truth and virtue, these can be obtained only be experience,
realized through freedom of thought, speech, and action.

The traditional

enemy of these freedoms has been the assumption by the government that
it ia the infallible judge, and that it has the right to suppress these
freedoms whenever it is in its interest to do so. Against this govern
mental control Kill argues that it defeats its own purpose, promotes
mediocrity, and prevents human progress. Claiming for the individual,
therefore, the maximum degree of freedom, he grants the only legiti
mate limitation which society or government may Impose is that which
prevents the individual from infringing on the rights of others. Hence
he concludes with the declaration that*
A State which dwarfs its men, in order that they may
be more docile Instruments in its hands even for
beneficial purposes — will find that with small men
no great thing can really be accomplished! and that
the perfection of machinery to which it has sacri
ficed everything will in the end avail it nothing,
for want of the vital power which, in order that
the machine might work more smoothly, it has pre
ferred to banish.-*-

1IUd., p. 170.
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la ad&tloa to the foregoing analysis of the oseay Oa lib e rty *
i t Is inpcartant now to consider two other major works of 111,
U tilitarianism and Considerations so Itoniicsentatlvc CSTOrnment* because
of the lntbiste relation which they bear to til® seated doctrine of
lib e rty , which ju s tify the standard presentst? on of the essentials of
Ids thought as being contained la thee* worts*

This bwsceiee a ll ths

m m evident when i t is recalled that tor him u t ilit y is the criW rion

o f vtrto si sad a fte r establishing on that hosts his doctrine o f lib e rty ,
he proceeds to in^tdrs into toe kind of government which w ill best as*
sure the to ll exercise of this sopericr buesn faculty*
The treatise dtlH tarianlgr* wm f ir s t published ia Fraser *a
"aaaslns la l&SL and repubHshed as a bode ia 1863*

toe f ir s t important

observation to be rwide oancendag this worts is that i t is u t ilit a r i*
anian with a difference* He begins his essay with a statement which Is
p ractically that o f his swnfcor Benthaat
The creed which accepts as the toundation o f morals,
U tility , or the greatest Happiness Principle, bolds
that actions are rig h t in proportion as they tend to
jsrawte bapjribness, wrong as they tend to pro-toco tbs
reverse o f happiness* By happiness is Intended
pleasure, and the absence of p a in f 'm tatoappixwss,
pain, and the privation of pleasure**
This statement comprises th® two basic principle® o f u tilita ria n is m
the greatest Tappinesa IV ’nciple, and ths d efinition of happiness in
terms of pi©a©*ure and pain*

Tbeee two swot 'be am®i'.tere<f separately be*

ca'jsa, in 'toe elaboration of Ms doctrine of u t ilit y , . I l l adheres to

s . r.m.B U tllitarlan lssi (bandana icnapiane, ’’rocn -iad Co**
1077) 6th ed*, pp.
..... 11..1

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

39

the first throughout but substantially modifies the second until it is
almost foreign to the creed of his predecessors*
The importance of th© Greatest Happiness Principle, in relation
to the doctrine of liberty, consists in the fact that it is the criterion

of what is good or evil in human thought and conductf and he consistent
ly holds that it is the very foundation of morality. Thus he declares*
This, happiness being, according to the utilitarian
opinion, the end of human action, is necessarily also
the standard of morality) which nay accordingly be
defined, the rules and precepts for human conduct, by
the observance of which an existence such as has been
described might be, to the greatest extent possible,
secured to all mankind) and not to them only, but so
far as the nature of things admits, to the whole
sentient creation.*
Regarding the second principle, in which he departs from Bentham,
it is sufficient to note a widening of the definition of happiness from
the limited pleasure and pain theory to include the raws humane values
of pleasures qualitatively different, the admission of emotional values,
and the higher intellectual and moral aspirations* This new view may

be seen in the following passage*
Genuine private affections, and a sincere interest in
the public good, are possible, though in unequal de
gree, to every rightly brought ip human being. In a
world in which there is so much to interest, so much
to enjoy, and so much also to correct and improve, every
one who has this moderate amount of moral and intel
lectual requisites is capable of an existence which
may be called enviable) and unless such a person,
through bad laws, or subjection to the will of others,
is denied the liberty to use the sources of happiness

1
Ibid.. p. 17*
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within hla ro&eh, ha sdll not fail to find this
enviable existence**
In the practical application of these principles Mill demands
that society, through education and favourable organisation, faoilitata
for tha individual tha axsroiaa of hla liberty in accordance with thia
higher interpretation of happiness* Thus ha saysi
Man losa thair high aspirations aa they lose their
intellactuAl tastes, because they hava not tins or
opportunity for Indulging themj and thay addlat
themselves to inferior pleasures, not hooauaa thay
deliberately prefsr them, hut baeauaa thay art
either tha only ones to which they hava access, or
tha only ones whioh they are any longar oapahla of
enjoying*?
To prevent the general degradation of
shown tha pleasures of the intellect*

society,

the common man m a t be

Mill's statement would appear to *

Indicate that the ignorance of the people, and thair incapability ia
choice of acts or pleasures, as before mentioned, are das purely to the
binding entanglements forced m

in which they live*

to them by tha government or the society

'Here appears too, in this work, tha problem aa to

who is to be the final authority in a

disputed

question, in this casaon

tha plane of choice of pleasures* If

there is

a doubt as to whioh of

tap pleasures is the best, or which of two modes of life ia the higher,
tha Judgment must be left to those persons who hava experienced both
sides of the question*

But M U

goes on to add that if there is a

^bld., p. a
2Ibid., p. 15*
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disagreement among these people of greater experience then the judg
ment of the majority must be accepted as the rule*

This appeal to the

democratic principle of the rule by M ajority Indicates a definite
slackening off of his former condemnation of the majority rule, a lthough he never completely outgrew his misgivings regarding political
majority rule#
This Introduction of tha democratic principle deciding so
fundamental a question as the Interpretation of happiness leads direct*
ly to the consideration of M s essay on Bepresentatlve government# In
the preface to this treatise he admits that it contains nothing new as
cosgtared with his previous writings.

There is novelty# however# in pre-

sentlng the old ideas in their proper connection# and he further justi
fies the treatise b/ saying that there is a need of a new political
doctrine whioh will not be a compromise between Conservatives and
Liberals but something higher which either party might adopt without
forsaking what is valuable in their own political creed#
In support of his statement that there is nothing new in this
essay# it might be profitable to relate it to the fourth chapter of the
essay on liberty where he discusses society and the individual) the type
of government which he advocates will be conditioned and determined by a
all he has said against governmental control and corporate interference
with the exercise of individual liberty. First, the form of government
Mill advocates must be popular# and he lays down three conditions under
this heading!
The people for whom the form of government is intended
must be willing to accept itj or at least not so
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swilling as to oppose axi iiieturwuntable obstacle to
Its ostablislwenb* Th®/ rvaet b® willing and able to
do what Is necessary to keep it standing* And they
mmt be willing and able to do what it
-'f
then to enable it to ftilfil its purposes* Th® word
’’do" is to b® understood as including forbearances m
well as sots* Uw/ m e t be capable of fulfilling
the oonditAons of aottoxi* and the conditions of selfrestraint* v lch ar® neoeseary either ffer laeening the
established polity in existence* or for enabling it
to achieve th® ends* its eonduoivensss to which ferns
its receamndatlon**
Xn seeking the criterion of a apod fora of goverrront* UXl discusses
two 'tmlitioo, sewed by Coleridge as Ibrasnenee and lYogreosion*
’•batover <«alltiee* therefore* in a ipvemnont* tend
to m m m m g m aot< vity* energy* courage* originality*
are recudcdtee of Permanence as well as o f mn^p&m$
only a somewhat less degree of thm will on the
average suffice for th© framer purpose than for the
latter*2
Odag further ia the search for the Ideal for® of government* he vigor
ously denounces a long-standing traction that the "good despot* consti
tutes the best fora, and asks*
wtiat should we then have? 0»a nan of eupcrhoma
wntal activity m m ^ L n g ths entire affairs of a
aonte&y passive people* thair passivity is to*
plied in the very idea o f absolute power* %e
nation as a whole* ond every individual eonpoetng
it, r>vti without any potential voice in their
own
no will in respect to
their collective Interest* AH le decided fur
t h m by a w ill not their own* :Mch i t Is legally
a crlne for then to disobey**

J* S* "liH * TH jlltarlanlgri* and Represeqtat.ive lowernraant* p. 177*
^ b id ** p* 186*
3Ibid.. p* ?03*
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It Is not necessary* for tbs purposes of our research, to pursue
further, in any greater detail, Mill's doctrine of representative
government.

TIm passages considered suffice to Indicate his thought,

as expressed here, with his views on liberty and the progress of nan
through the free exercise of that liberty according to the principle
of utility. He does, indeed, consider the proper functions of the
government, its infirmities and dangers, the representation of ainorl*
ties, the extension of the suffrage, and the modes of its exercise, but
these are all dominated by a vsry strong and clear concept of a demo
cratic fora of government, adjusted and adapted to his doctrine of
individual freedom and progress*
There ie no difficulty In showing that the ideally
best form of government is that in which the sover
eignty, or supreme controlling power in the last
resort, is vested in the entire aggregate of the
community! every citlsen not only having a Voice In
the exercise of that ultimate sovereignty, but being,
at least occasionally, called on to take an actual
part in the government, by ths personal discharge
of some public function, local or general.1
There remains now, the question, what did Mill mean by the ten*
“liberty”? Before determining the answer to this problem, several con
siderations must be taken into account.

In his system of logic Mill

holds that the first step in any discussion is die definition of the
terms employedj but also in the logic, he distinguishes between induction
and “induction improperly so-called.” According to the second kind of
reasoning,one progresses from particular to particular and not from

^Ibid., p. 207.
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particular to the general law >v principle* la the dcvelopnont of the
doctrine o f liberty f i n Is attempting to apply the esperinental nethod
of onptrical science to social and mral uestl.one, and in this process
he nakes the second aethod of induction M s Item of procedure* '.'ere*
over, the power to define* in the strictest sense InpUea the power to
knew definitely* finally* ond Absolutely M

a thing Is* But this*

according to Hill* amounts to infallibility, and since he cannot dal*
for hteelf what he denies to all others* the nearest approach to *
definition possible for M a is a working hypothesis or descriptive type
of definition which outlines the conditions of liberty*
Since there is no specifis definition of the t o m in M s work*
the facet clear and concise answer to the aieetton proposed above nay he
found in the descriptive ©lenentc that have been expressed throughout
the works eoneiderodl
a) The individual is sovereign over M s self•regard; ng thoughts*
words, m 3 ads*
b) The only eondf tion under which society m y linit those
freedom is that In which the individual infringes upon the liberties
of others*

o) The ends of m n - truth rind virtue - can only be obtained
thrnigh frecdon of thought* -:E.0en.»rfon, and action* since there is no
infallible «*t4t»r of *hat is true or false* good or evil) ary attsnpt
to limit these essential freedom is the assuryitian -■£ in f a llib ilit y .
The riling principle of the doctrine of liberty is one of Absolute in*
sulatian in the interest of individual devwlcprieni*

-.*aeed on these
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nasdjsa is the ‘teftnitten of liberty* liberty consist® in the pursuit of
.ijoost or virtu»t and th* individual is United in M s pursuit oifly by the
r*.ght of th* other s»rfo*re of society te a tta in the ease endf It is the

condition of progree®, both Individual and sodLatj and i t i® a re la tiv e
and advancing principle, differing fron nation to nation taid fron age to
a®**
7hMM points contain the essential elements o f Hll's descriptive
definition of civil liberty based upon his concept of peychol& £eal
.freedom* If th® definition m m

reduced still further, ten characteristics

m y be specifically noted* the ©fsaaoration of the basis freedoms of the
ind ividu al, of thought, speech, and action* secondly, th® e>ndaLtions
rata* vhieh the state m y Halt these freedoms, not on any abstract
principle of its c m authority, but t* safeguard th® liberties of other
individuals in society* liberty, under these ccmdltlons, is the protect*

ion of the individual against th© tyranny of every other tedividual in
society, tfoethsr the offending person be acting singularly or vith the
majority*
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INFLUENCE AND REACTION
An analysis of the contemporary reactions and criticisms which
these writings by M ill, and particularly the essay On Liberty, evoked in
nineteenth century England w ill be helpful toward# a more complete unde**standlnc of M ill*# doctrine*

The purpose ia to find further precision#

of his idea in the lig h t of d iat hi# contemporaries understood him to
say*
The fir s t piece of c ritic a l material to be considered appear# in
the American Presbyterian aid Theological Review and is a reprint of an
a rtic le by James M’ Cosh, LL.D., which appeared originally in The British
and Foreign Evangelical Review of A p ril, 1868.

This a rtic le , entitled

M ill*a Reply to Hi# C ritics, has in common with most of the c ritic a l
artic le s to b© examined that i t is directed toward M ill’ s theory of
knowledge and of m orality, in which he denies the existence of necessary
truth* the special reason fo r the attack is that these notions are the
very foundations of his doctrine of lib e rty .

After expressing his admi

ration for the dialectic and deductive a b ility of M ill, M’ Cosh indicates
a certain defect which he finds in this author, " It is peculiarly a
clear and penetrating understanding*

but i t is not distinguished by wide

1*6
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sympath and philosophical comprehensiveness•

The author traces this

this facult to M ill’ s early education, and says*
I t is surely conceivable that he may have been so
fille d with his own system, inherited from a beloved
father, and cherished resolutely at the time when
the tide was a ll against him, and that i t may now
bulk so largely before his eyes, as to mate him to
some extent incapable of appreciating, or even
thoroughly comprehending, those who look on things
from a different point of view .2
Observing the privileged position which M ill gives to the role of
memory as an in tu itio n endowed with certitude, the c ritic expresses
dissatisfaction with M ill’ s handling of association, " It relates to the
power of association to generate new ideas and to produce b e lie f, in
fa c t, to take the place of judgment or the comparison of things.

It

is , perhaps, the most fa ta l of a ll the errors in Mr. M ill's speculation."3
Proceeding in his criticism of M ill’ s theory of knowledge, he observes hat
M ill has not su fficien tly understood or explained what is involved in
sensation*
He never sees what is re a lly involved in sensation,
which is never fe lt except as a sensation of s e lf,
But I have a s t i l l greater complaint against him
for never te llin g us precisely what association
can do, and what i t can not d o ... he makes
association a source of new ideas. In other words,

James M’Cosh, LL.D., M ill’ s Reply to His C ritics, in "The
American Presbyterian and Theological' Review" (New Yo'iic: J.M. Sherwood,
1868), XVII, p. 350.

2Ib id . , p. 359.
3Ib id ., p. 377.
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he rives to new association a power which the
a p rio ri philosophers have given to the in
te lle c t,!
I t is interesting to re c a ll the development of M ill’ s philosophy which
led him to the w riting of his Logic,

Having inherited the eighteenth

century enthusiasm for progress and enlightenment and a complete compe
tence in the efficacy of education in the formation of human character
and human ideas and conduct, M ill wished to apply to ethics and p o litics
and a ll social problems the inductive methods which had proved so
successful in the fie ld o f physical science.

He apparently accepted

the theory of association of ideasj knowledge becomes for him nothing
but a firm and coherent association of ideas, and what the a p rio ri
philosophers called the necessity of truth is simply the firmness and
s ta b ility of these associations.

In fa c t, i t would appear that M ill's

whole logical theory is constructed on the basis of laws of association.
The c r itic , however, objects to this characteristic of M ill's theory by
which he gives too much to experience and association, arri too l i t t l e
attention to the ro le of in tellectu al judgment.

In illu s tra tio n of this

point M'Cosh sayst
This brings us to the ® nsideration of the now
notorious examples which he adduces of the raost
certain principles of arithmetic arri geometry
being unbelievable in other circumstances J that
2x2 moy be 5) that p a ra lle l lines nay meet j that
two right lines being produced w ill meet at
two points j and that two or more bodies may

Loc.cit.
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exist in the same place.3.
In this passage i t is to be noted th a t, what a p rio ri philosophers and
conceptualiats would c a ll fir s t principles and necessary truths, are
not so regarded by M ill and for the reasons seen above.

M'Cosh further

observes that M ill regarded the examples cited above as, "fitte d to
lessen our assurance of the certainty of objective truth",^

This

tendency, according to the c r itic , leads toward the most disastrous
consequences and renders a ll knowledge subjective and relative} M ill,
in the words o f’ the author, "strips man of the power of reaching positive
truth and of pronouncing judgment on the re a lity of things."3 The
a rtic le concludes by designating M ill as a Nominalist, since he lim its
himself to a comparative study of terms and ideas to the neglect of the
base problem of the relation between things and thoughts, wh’ch is of
primary concern to the conceptualiat in epistomology fo r whom words are
signs of thoughts and thoughts are similitudes of things.

The author

declares*
Hr. M m ia a nominalist, and looks at the name, its
denotation and connotation, instead of the mental
exercise} whereas, I am a conceptualiat (though,
certainly, not in the sense in whch many are), and
have labored to br^ng out the process pf mind involved
in the notion, judgment and reasoning.h

XIb id . , pp. 379-380.
2Ib id .. p. 380.
3Ib id . . p. 381.

j|Ib id ., pp. 383- 381*.
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A later a rtic le in the same review, en titled Mr. M ill and Ilia
G rit lea , and w ritten by Francis Bower, covers p ractically the same ground
as the criticism considered above, and attacks H ill’ s denial of necessary
tru th .

This author finds M ill’ s treatment of mathematical axioms en

tir e ly unsatisfactory and quotes him to the effect th ati
We should probably have no d iffic u lty in putting
together the two ideas supposed to be incompatible,
i f our experience had not fir s t inseparably associated one of' them with the contradictory of the
other. 1
And he observes th a t, according to M ill, the only reason why we cannot
believe that two plus two are five is that we have been uniformly
accustomed to think that they are four.

Bower exclaims, "Surely this

is empiricism run mad, since .it is more than the stoutest advocate of
the doctrine, that a l l our knowledge of real things is derived from ex
perience, needs to a ffir m .A g a in s t this emplrlcims of M ill, Mr. Bower
concludes with the following declaration!

The compatibility or incompatibility of two given
attributes with each other is a universal tru th ,
even a necessary and immutable tru th , which is
often grasped quite as firm ly through a single
in tu itio n , as through a multitude of experiments j
moat of the primary truths of mathematics are of
this character.3
The next critical source which must be considered comprises a
series of three articles which appeared anonymously in the “Dublin Re

view" in the following secjucnce i

the first is entitled Mill on Liberty

Francis Bower, ,\ir. M ill and His C ritic s , in "The American
Presbyterian and Theological Review", XVIII, p . 356.

^Loc.cit.
a
^Loc.cit.
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which appeared In 1869; the second, Mr. M ill 19 Denial of Necessary
Truth, in the year 1871; and fin a lly , Mr, M ill on the Foundation of
M orality, written In 1872,
Tb.e f ir s t essay opens with an observation on the d iffic u lty
with which the c r itic is faced in discussing M ill's doctrine of lib 
erty due to the failu re on his part to give a definition Oi what he
means by liberty*
He leaves his reader at the disadvantage of having
to pick out and join together the detached pieces
of a puzzle; to learn the map of lib e rty as we used
to learn geography, with this difference, that under
that system w© knew when the whole map was complete,
whereas Mr, ^ i l l furnishes us w ith no means of such
assurance,!
In analysing what the author calls the principles on which the doctrine
rests, he covers the fam iliar ground of the soversignty f the in 
dividual and the lim itatio n of compulsion or control to self-protection;
the denunciation of lim ita tio n o f individual freedom of thought, word,
and action as the assumption of in fa llib ility ; the appeal to u t ility as
the standard on a ll ethical questions; the empirical approach to truth
and virtu e , which the w rite r calls "the old, exploded Pyrrhonism"; and
asks t
Why did he not begin his essay with the declaration
that his whole system is a mere guess? that he
Icnowg nothing of what he is w riting about; and that
as uhere must needs be many errors to one truth,
the chances are a thousand to one that he is going

**<111 on Liberty, in "The Dublin Review", X III, New Series,
(London* Hurns,' Oates' anti Co.), pp.63-6U,
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to write absurdities*3'
The central criticism in this a rtic le is already implied in the state
ment just quoted, that the lack of certitude, which is the ultimate out
come of M ill1s theory of knowledge, reduces his own declarations con
cerning lib e rty to the level of personal opinions with no ju s tific a tio n
beyond M ill's own authority.

The c r itic further shows the destructive

influence of this basic deficiency by placing in juxtaposition the
following pair of maxims of which M ill makes so much*
The only purpose for uhlch power can be rig h tfu lly
exercised over any member of a civ ilized common
against his w ill, is to prevent harm to others.*
The second is*
Despotism is a legitim ate mode of government in
dealing with barbarians, provided the end be
th eir improvement, and the means ju s tified by
actually e ffe c t' ng that end. Liberty, as a prin
ciple, has no application t i l l men have become
capable of being improved by free and equal dis
cussion. 3
The author then points out that before these declarations can have any
meaning i t should be known what is meant by "rig h tfu lly ", despotism",
and "c iv iliza tio n ".
terms

The question is raised as to who is to define these

that M ill leaves vague.

For example,

tion d iffe r) scarcely two men w ill

agree on

opinions regarding

c iv ilis a 

a defintion ofthe words.

1Tbld«, p. 66.
2Ib id ., P. 70,
3Ib id ., P. 70.
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Whether a nation has arrived at the point where i t is car able of im
provement by free and equal discussion is a ratter o f opinion.

I t ia on

th is point, the author declares, that the whole controversy turns*

The

only meaning i t can possibly have is to be found in the opinion of Mr*
''ill,

Hie author demands that M ill define his terras or give up his

p r'n clp le.

The criticism becomes more sever® when he finds M ill saying

that rdnnty-nins raen oat of & hundred are incapable of judging any
matter not self-evident.

And so i t comes to th is , that ninety-nine men

out o f a hundred, "mast be slaves to Mr. M ill’s in tellectu al d iscip line,
in. order that they may enjoy a lib e rty whose sweets they ne ther desire
new even understand."* Th® a rtic le concludes with other examples and
illu stration s of the general aim which th© author claims he had in w rit
ing the a rtic le , to point out th® inconsistencies with which the essay
On Liberty abounds* The fin a l judgment voiced by the c r itic Is that
they (M ill’ s propositions) are*
Sothlng but popular fallacies ore s k illfu lly stated
than usual**.there is no profound philosophy in them,
at least having no claim whatever to be the hundredth
man,#* .we confess, we have no d iffic u lty whatever in
admitting our in a b ility to understand this fabric
without basis, this lever with out fulcrum, this pro
cess from no s ta rt! ngj-plac# and towards no goal, t ‘!s
knowledge begotten of doubt, th is logic without pre
misses and without condusion, or rather, le t us aay,
this ocean of hypothetical propositions which yields
before us and closes behind us, as though the whole
in tellectu al lif e and a c tiv ity of man were on® in
fin ite and sternal If * *

XIb ld *. p. 73*
2Ib ld *. pp. 72-73.
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The next tiro articles constitute a serims attack on two of the

major points in M ill*a doctrine, truth and virtue, fo r which M ill says
there is no in fa llib le arbiter or judge and which can be obtained only
by fre e experimentation on the basis of u tility *

These ideas are

essential to his doctrine of lib e rty *
In the fir s t of these articles the author identifies M ill with
the Fhenomeniat school and declares that M ill is a more satisfactory
representative of this school than any other for purposes of controversy
because there is no other, "who has carried out philosophical principles
into nearly so large a fie ld of practical application".*

The corner

stone of M ill*s system, this w rite r declares, is "his denial th at there
is any truth cognizable by man as necessary."2 lienee he proceeds to
say th at i f M ill were to admit that tie re can be found one truth that is
recognized as necessary his philosophy as a whole would be shattered*
The a rtic le goes on to establish the argument that mathematical truths
are cognizable to man as necessary*

I t is further pointed out that a

necessary proposition or truth is one, the contradictory of which is an
in trin s ic impossibility and could not be found in any possible region
of existence.

These truths must be such as can be called significant*

that is , that th© predicate declares something that is not contained in
the subject.

Further, they ere such that by simply considering the ideas

lnThe Dublin Review", X 7 II, p. 286.
2Ib id . t p. 207.
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of the subject and predicate one comes to see that there re a lly exists
between them that relate on which the proposition declares.

For example,

the whole is greater than any one of its parts, is a self-evident and
necessary proposition because, as soon as one understands what a whole
is and what a part is , one sees th© tru th which the proposition declares
and which is therefore self-evident and necessary.

However, M m w ill

not admit that th is is a self-evident and necessary truth but a general
isation based on experience,

this applies with equal force to a ll

mathematical axioms.
The author then shifts to a criticism of b i l l ’ s psychological
theory, "which alleges that man*s b e lie f in necessary truth does not
authenticate aqy corresponding re a lity , but results from past uni
form ity in the association of i d e a s . ’This "association", according
to M ill, has become so established in the mind that there appears to be
an a p rio ri connection between the ideas.

The c r itic next points out

that the constant experience of two ideas in relation to one another
causes one to believe "that in every possible region of existence
phenomena succeed each other by uniform laws." 2 He then indicates that
in the logic M ill states that in some other firmament outside of that
one experienced events may "succeed each other without fixed laws."^
Therefore, the experience which contributes to the consistent association
of certain ideas makes i t impossible to imagine these experienced

1Ib id . , p. 289.
2Jbid., p. 290.
^ lo c .c it.
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successions taking place in any other manner#
Later in the a rtic le the two principles of M ill’ s doctrine -with
which his c ritic is taking issue are summed up as follows*
The f ir s t is , that men never account any proposition
self-evidently necessary, except one which they have
repeatedly for an indefinite period observed by experienoe to be true# The second allegation is , tFat
whenever two phenomenal facts are undeviastingly and
unmistakably experiences in union, a thinker almost
inevitably is deluded into the fancy, that there is
some necessary connection between them#*
The fir s t of these he dismisses by illu s tra tin g that a person who has
never experienced a certain proposition before w ill immediately recog
nize i t a® self-evident when the facts are put before him.

He also

denies the second of M ill’ s statements and illu s tra te s his denial with
everyday experiences, extending them to other and unexpected possibil
itie s , ending with the statement*
That which I have never experienced, I regard as
necessary} that wh3.ch 'I have habitually and uncxceptionally experienced, 1 regard'"as contingent.
losuceHaxmy therefore mere constant and unifarm
experience cannot possibly account - as Mr# M ill
thinks it does - for the mind*® connection of
self-evident necessity*2
Towards the end of the essay is found the definition of the Phenomenistic
doctrine to which M ill was identified in the opening rages*
The phenomenistic doctrine is such as th is* that an
ascertained tru th , means a truth experiened or in
ferred from experiene ej that he who lays stress on
supposed intuitions, leaves a foundation of lock to
build on the said} that such a thinker, instead of

1Ib id «# p. 297.
2Ib id ., p. 299*
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manfully and philosophically confronting facts,
erects into a would-be oracle his own individual
idiosyncracyj that "a p rio ri philosophy" means
simply the enthronement of prejudice and the
rejection of experience.
The fir s t refutation of this doctrine, the c r itic claims, in
volves an examination of tie role of memory in experience, and here he
finds that M ill contradicts himself fo r, w riting on the philosophy of
Hamilton, M ill said, "Our b e lie f in the veracity of memory is evidently
ultim ate: no reason can.be given far i t , which does not presuppose the
b e lie f and assume i t to be well grounded."^ Here M ill frankly confesses
that when we trust our memory we believe ourselves to have experienced
what our memory d is tin ctly te s tifie s - we are resting exclusively on an
intuition? we are holding raost firm ly a truth fo r which experience gives
us no warrant at a ll.

Thus, the c ritic concludes:

Unless I hold this in tu itiv e tru th I am lite r a lly in 
capable of receiving any experience whatever? I have
no knowledge of any kind, except ray present con
sciousness. The whole fabric of experience then has,
for its exclusive foundation, a series of those in
tuitions wfaich are called acts of memory. I f intuitions
as such are to be distrusted experience is an im
possibility and its veiy notion an absurdity.3
Here M ill has made an extraordinary exception to the general doctrine of
the Phenomenistsj no other member of that school would make a statement

1Ib ld ., p. 309.
2

John Stuart M ill, An Examination of S ir William Hamilton’ s
Philosophy (New York: Henry Holt' and ^o.» iEBIj), I , ' p. 2l6n.
3"The Dublin Review," X V II, p. 309.
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such as that quoted above♦ The c r itic , therefore, interprets i t as,
"Bo reason can be given fo r the veracity of memory which does rot pre
suppose the very thesis far which i t is adduced."'*’ The author believes
that he has found an admission on M ill's part that there is a necessaiy
or a p rio ri tru th , the veracity of memory.

I f he admits this one, the

author eannot see why he refuses to admit the in tu itio n implied in a ll
physical science and which is indeed the fundamental tru th which science
requires for its existence, that nature obeys uniform laws.

This would

provide or establish a certain o bjectivity, necessity, and permanence
to scien tific truth* but i t is precisely what M ill refuses to accept
and argues that there may be, on some other planet in the universe, a
different set of laws according to which natural phenomena take place,
"In other words", the author says, that doctrine of phenominism, which
in some sense idolizes physical science, is in real truth fa ta l to the
object of its i d o l a t r y . i t is his contention that the affirmations
of physical science have no v a lid ity , except for the immediate present,
unless one grants the s ta b ility of essences and the uniformity of natur
a l a c tiv itie s , and, therefore, of natural laws as the basis of scienti
fic knowledge as i t may be applied to the future.

The ultimate basis

for th is objectivity and necessity of the laws of nature is to be
found in th® doctrine of an in te llig m t, fre e , personal God, Who created
th© world and implanted in nature this permanent way of operating.
When, therefor©, he claims that M ill rejects the permanent and uniform

1Ib id . , p. 309n.
2"The Dublin Revie ■*», X V II, p. 317.
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character of nature, the c ritic charges that this results from his dis
b e lie f in a personal God and calls him an anti-Theist.

He says, ’’We con*

tend that this phenomenistic doctrine is cues legitim ately in pronounced
a n ti-th e is m ,T h is charge suggests- that In the c r itic ’ s mind the
ultim ate basis of objective and necessary tru th is to be found in the
veracity of God, and since M ill is anti-Theistie he has no re a l basis
fo r any objective and necessaiy truth} and therefore. M ill cannot
legitim ately propound a doctrine of lib e rty which should be based on
objective ami necessary norms or principles*
Before attempting to pass judgment on the c ritic a l a rtic le just
examined i t w ill be more economical to reserve that judgment u n til after
the examination of the second a rtic le ty the same author in another
issue of the review entitled Mr, M ill on the Foundations of M orality,
This decision is based on what w ill appear to be a very close p ara lle l
and relationship between the defects attacked and the solution offered,
by the c ritic , on the problem of knowledge and the problem of m orality.
With the declaration that there exists no in fa llib le arbiter
of tru th and fa ls ity , thereby denying the existence of any ual?-evident,
necessary and objective norms of tru th , there is the companion declara
tion th at there are no self-evident and necessary moral axioms with re
gard to good and e v il*
Mr. M ill admits of course tha t moral judgment a are very
frequently e lic ite d j but, denying the existence of any
necessary truths, he denies inclusively that there are

XIb id ,,

p,

309,
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moral truths 3clf-evidently necessary* the ground
whidh h© often seesai to take Is * that no moral
judgments are intuitions* but th tt a ll are in fe r
encesj though these In f trances* he would add* are
so readily and imperceptibly drawn, as to be most
naturally and almost Inevitably mistaken for
intu itio ns*!
By way of analysing this position of M ill, the w riter sets down as a
simple and primary notion in a l l morality the notion of moral good
ness* and declares that fo r M ill "morally good** as applied to human
acts* means neither more nor less than "conducive to general enjoyment*.
Listing a series of sample statements* which he says involve the idea
of moral goodness in various spheres* the author concludes that even

M ill would not accept the equation, morally good equals '.hat which is
conducive to general happiness* in those p raetial applications.

I t is

then th© aim* in, this c ritic a l a rtic le , to shew that there are in 
tu itiv e moral judgments* universal and necessary* called the f ir s t prin
ciples of morality* and how these are obtained*

The c ritic claim that

In th® f ir s t Instance he Intuits^ as a sclf-o vi out and necessary truth*
that his betrayal of a friend*® confidence, for example, Is in trin s ic a lly
e v il and, in a second step, lie in tu its as self-evidently necessary that
a ll such betrayals in Ilk© circumstances arc likewise In trin s ic a lly
e v il*

Pointing out that this recognition of e v il is p ara lle l to the

in tu itio n of the veracity of memory, which cannot be proven or demon
strated! the author el*h«s that M ill must a d .lt i t as a fin a l* and

necessary, moral principle.

Having used this merely as an illu s tra tio n ,

^Th® Dublin Review", m i l , p. 1;0,
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he argues that there are many such necessary and self-evident principles
which could be summed up under the universal principle, pood is to be
done and e v il avoided.

He concludes that there are stronger grounds

fo r accepting the distinct declarations of the moral faculty, or con
science, than th© distinct declaration of memory#
Again, following th© pattern found in the previous a rtic le re
viewed, he introduces the doctrine of a divine sanction as the necessary
concomitant of conscience and declares that while the notion, "morally
e v il* does not include in i t , "prohibited by 5 ome personal being", s t i l l ,
in fa c t, the two are related! and he says that conscience always in
volves the recognition of a liv in g object towards which i t is directed,
One to IShom we are responsible.

There is no other way, he claims, to

account fo r the remorse, self-condemnation, and misery which results
from the commission of an e v il deed in secret, except the spontaneous
in tu tive recognition on the part of man of the existence of a supreme
law-giver and judge to whom he is responsible.

This doctrine gives

meaning to the statement that there can b® no stable, permanent, ob
jective cod© of morality without the recognition of God as its origin
and sanction.
To sum up, perhpao the best way to state the controversy and the
disagreement herein indicated, between M ill and his c ritic on the found
ation

of

morality ie

and morally e v il.

th eir disagreement on what is meant by morally good

M ill declares that morally good means that which is

conducive to general happiness, and morally e v il that which is adverse
to the promotion of general enjoyment.

He further holds that in the

application of this in particular cases there are not objective moral
axioms or principles in the lig h t of which moral rood 3 nd e v il may be
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judgedj H ill would base -.’.oral judgements on general conclusions drawn
from the experiences of lif e .

But the c r itic objects to tide social

standard of what i t generally useful oar beneficial, and bases hie
morality on tail vernal and necessary moral axioms, in tu itiv e ly known
by reason and in tu itiv e ly related to a Supreme being as th eir ultimate

source and sanction# The c r itic seeks to score a victory over M ill by
discovering adnor internal inoonslsteaoiee in the elaboration of the
doctrine, which constitutes the very foundation of hie doctrine of
lib e rty *

The c r itic intimates that the denial by M ill of any universal

and necessary moral law, and of th® recognition of a law-giv e r and,
Judge in questions of moral good and e v il, would cause hie doctrine of
lib e rty to degenerate into license in which there would b e no possible
control o v e rt!* self-regarding acts of the individual, whan they did
not produce personal moral improveeaent#
The ultimate issue between M ill and this c r itic can be identified
as th e ir disagreement on the theory of knowledge# for the c r itic , miaan
knowledge, although dependant on experience fo r its content, acquires a
value of certitude aid truth throw# th® organization of the data of
experience and its interpretation in the lig h t of imsBitabl®, self-evident,
and primary principles bath in the speculative and practical order#
Through this means the theory issues in the establishment of the object
iv ity of knowledge* what is txue, according to th is method, is universal
ly tru e, not just for one man but for a ll men, not only for or® ago but
for a ll time#

For M ill, on the contrary, starting from the experience

of th® individual, th® best that can be obtained is a sort of personal
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tru th , ■which has value for h is Individual} and i t possesses only a
tentative character depending upon the present circumstances which,
i f changed, would change the conclusion#
In an attempt to estimate the character of the criticism #' ich
has just been analyzed, it would seem that the two groupd of a rtic le s ,
those appearing in the American Presbyterian and Theological Review
and in the Dublin Review, attack M ill from a backgromd of the recog
n itio n of fir s t principles, self-evident axioms, and objective truths
which are regarded as necessary forth© s ta b ility and v a lid ity o f his
doctrine of lib erty*

From th e ir religious preoccupations they

sim ilarly maintain the existence of necessary truths bearing divine
sanction and which serve as f ir s t principles In the order of truth
and morality as r presented by creeds and commandments# The whole of
th e ir argumentation, founded on this starting point, aims to prove Lk*#
M ill illo g ic a l, inconsistent, inconclusive and erroneous} and, in vari
ous ways, they designate him as an Em piricist, a nominalist, and a
P o s itiv is t, incapable of formulating an accurate and permanent doctrine
of lib e rty *
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CONTEMPORARY EVALUATION
In 1373, the year of M ill’s death, two books appeared -which
attempt to evaluate his contributions to the cause of freedom j the
f ir s t work treats d irectly with the doctrine of lib e rty , and the second
is a tribute to his attainments in the p o litic a l realm.
The f ir s t work: to be examined is a book by James Fitzjames
Stephen, Q.C., entitled Liberty, Equality and Fraternity, the American
edition of which appeared in 1873.

The section on Liberty is specific

a lly concerned with the doctrine as exposed by M ill,

After linking the

general doctrine of lib e rty , equality, and. fra te rn ity with various
p o litic a l and religious forms whidh have made I t th eir business to pro
mote these ideals, Stephen characterises the doctrine as the religion of
humanity and as being possibly the best name that can be found for it *
He then points out*
No better statement of the popular view - I m i-*it,
perhaps, say of the religious dogma of lib e rty is to be found than that which is contained in Mr*
M ill’ s essay on the subject. His works on
U tilitarianism and the Subjection of Women afford
excellent illu stration s of the forms of the doc
trines of equality and fra te rn ity to which I object,1

^James Fitsjames Stephen, Liberty, Equality and Fraternity
(New Yorki Holt and fillia m s , 1873), p» u.
Ox
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Indicating his dissent from the widespread and in flu e n tia l opinions re
garding this democratic ideal, he saya that M ill’ s exposition On Liberty
is the ablest, most reasonable, and clearest*

He then proceeds to a

summary of the introductory chapter which he claims is the most Import
ant part of the -work, restating the claims ttiich M ill makes fo r thought,
speech, act, and the lim itations he places about government and society
in attempting to restrain or control those freedoms, and the extension
of th is

liberty of the individualto combinations of individuals*

Such

being the doctrine, Stephen observes with wonder, that Mr, M ill never
attempts to prove i t as a whole.

After a b rie f suiaaary of the rest of

the contents of the essay, chapter by chapter, he say?*
There is hardly anything in the whole essay which can
properly be called proof as distinguished from enunci
ation or assertion of the general principles quoted,
I think, however, that i t s i l l not be d iffic u lt to
show that the principle stands in much need of proof*
Beginning, then, with the word1"lib erty", and claiming to interpret i t
according to the principles which he holds in common with f i l l , he
develops its meaning as follows*
A ll voluntary act® are caused by motives. A ll motives
may be placed in one of two categories - hope and fea r,
pleasure and pain* Voluntary acts of which hope is the
motive are said to be fre e . Voluntary acts of which fear
is the motive are said to be done under compulsion, or
omitted under re s tra in t*.*
I f this is the true theory of lib e rty - and, though
many persons would deny th is , I do not think hr. M ill
i7o-old - the propositions already stated w ill in a con
densed form amount to this* "No one is every ju s tifie d

Ib id ., pp. 8-5?.
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In trying to affect anyone*8 conduct by exciting
hie fears, except fo r the sake of self-protection1*}
or, making another substitution, which he would
also approve - " It can never promote the general
happiness of mankind that the conduct of any persona
should be affected by an appeal to th e ir fears, ex
cept in the cases excepted*"*
Such assertions, this author observes, can not be regarded as self-evident
and hence they stand in reed of proof*

Indeed, be finds the® opposed to

a ll m orality, existing religions, and criminal legislations insofar as
they aim at affecting h- man conduct in that they appeal either to hope
or fe a r, and to fear more commonly and more emphatically than to hops*
Thus, he adds*
For on® act from which on® person is restrained by the
fear of the law of the land, many persons are restrained
fro® iraiuasrable acts by the fear of the disapprobation
of th e ir neighbours, which is the moral sanction} or by
the fe a r of the punishment in a future state of existence,
which ie the religious sanction} or by -tee fea r of th eir
cam disapprobation, which may be called tbs conscientious
sanction, and may be regarded as a compound case of the
other two*2
The author proceeds to assert that neither tbs moral sanction nor the
rclirio u s sanction have anything to do whatever with self-protect ion,
yet M ill intimates that the moral sanction is essentially immoral and
mischievous, and though ho does not draw this in f ©pence, the author
says.it is involved in th© theory, that a day of general Judgment is
fundamentally immoral* He conclude® Ms reasoning with this statement,
"A Ood who punished anyone at a ll, except for the purpose of protecting

1Ib id ., pp. >10*
Ib id *, | >* 10*
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others, would, upon his principles, he a tyrant trampling upon lib e rty .
He sums up M ill’s moral principles as follows*
"Let every man please himself without hurting his
neighbour"} and every moral system which aimed at
mere than th is , either to obtain benefits for
society at large other than protection against
injury or to do good to the persons affected, would
be wrong in principle. This would condemn every
existing system of morals.2
I t is clear, from these passages, th a t Stephen finds the moral theory of
M ill so much at variance with existing morality which, he says, in a ll
its form in a prohibitive system reaching fa r beyond the lim its indicat
ed in his notion of salf-^protectionj that i t stands d efin itely in need
of proof.
Mr. Stephen not only finds M ill’ s d efinition opposed to a ll
existing systems of morality but opposed to the h istorical conditions of
a ll great revolutionary movements, and he gives as illu s tra tio n the
Reformation and the French Revolution*
They were brought about by force, and in manyinstances
by the force of a minority numerically small,applied
to the conduct of an ignorant or very p a rtia lly in
formed and for the most part indifferent majority.’
Stephen

adds that M ill would be the last person to say that force was not

ju s tifia b le in these cases? and yet

i t cannot be ju s tifie d on thegrounds

of self-protection alone.
The criticism of Stephen might be summed up in the following
manner* as a sympathetic admirer of M ill he agrees with much of the
1

Ib id ., p. 11

^Loc.cit.
3Ib id . ,

p. 20.
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doctrine of lib e rty in principle.

Contrary to then e ’.#10 claim M ill did

not define lib e rty , he finds and rewords the d efin itio n .

But his c r itic 

ism is directed against the failu re on M ill*® part to establish, by
proof, what he lays down as principle,

^he second objection is that of

inconsistency, fo r not only are facts and experience opposed to the new
m orality, but his exposition of i t abounds in exceptions and q u alific
ations which Stephen would gladly have exchanged fa r proofs*

To

illu s tra te taro inconsistencies pointed out by Stephen, reference may be
made b rie fly to the discussion regarding savage peoples, w ere M ill
admits of despotism, and the undetermined question as to who is to de
cide when these people become capable of lib e rty .

For Stephen says,

"The wildest savages, and the most immature youths, capable of any sort
of education, are capable of being improved by free discussion upon a
great variety of subjects,"^

and intimates that there is a necessity

fo rth ® freedoms M ill advocates even in the most prim itive society, i f
that society is to progress according to the method laid down by M ill.
A second illu s tra tio n is to the effect that Parliamentary Government is
simply a mild and disguised form of compulsion*
We agree to tr y strength by counting heads instead of
breaking heads, but the principle is excactly the same...
The minority gives way not because i t is convinced that
i t is wrong, but because i t is convinced that i t is a
m inority,2
Before leaving Stephen, his position on the question of lib e rty
may be b rie fly stated* he agrees with M ill that man should enjoy lib arty

XXbid.. p. 25.
^ Ib ld ., pp. 27-28.
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of thought, speech, and actionj but that the power of society, in what
ever form, must be enlarged beyond the principle of s e lf protection, on
the basis of the principle of the democratic rule by the majority j and in
the name of human moral vines which are independent of th e ir discovery
by individual, and independently and objectively true in every case*
I t has been observed that lib e rty , lik e anything else, may be
considered in the abstract or in the concrete, theoretically or practic
a lly *

Applying this principle to M ill *a doctrine of lib e rty , i t must be

conceded that, in the lig h t of the c ritic a l material which has been ex
amined , as a theory i t has been subject to adverse criticism ranging
from the most severe strictures to m ild, but sympathetic, objections*
When, however, the practical order is considered i t may be found that
M ill*s doctrines have attained some success*

Strangely enouiji, die

opinion has often been expressed th at, as a practical p o litic ia n , M ill
was a failu re and that he stands as an illu s tra tio n of the notion that
a philosopher is out of place in practical p o litics*
In a series of essays w ritten as a trib ute to M ill a fte r his
death, and published in 1673, M illie ea-ft Garrett Fawcett opposes this
last view and traces the idea of his fa ilu re to those who were out of
sympathy with his social reforms*
I f to be unpopular because he promoted the practical success
of the opinions his lif e had been spent in advocating is
to have fa ile d , then Mr* M ill failed * I f , however, the
success of a p o litician is to be measured by the degree in
which he is able personally to influence the course of
p o litic s , and attach to himself a school of p o litic a l
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thought, then Mr. M ill, in the best meaning of the
words, has succeeded.^
Mrs. Fawcett here points out that he attached to himself a school of
p o litic a l thought whereby she means the school of Philosophic Radicals
who, through the Westminster Review and the U tilita ria n Society, exer
cised .treat influence with the "Shiga, and, as they were la te r known,
the Liberals, as to prompt them tot
Undertake the removal of abuses and the abolition
of restrictions. It was they who inspired electoral
refora (1832), the first State grant for education
(1833), the hew Poor law (l33ir), and the Municipal
Corporations Act (l835>). They co-operated with the
Evangelicals in the abolition of slavery in 1833,
because they loved freedom, but opposed the Factory
Act of 1833, because they believed in Laissez Fairo.^

Outstanding among his practi cal achievements was the extension of the
suffrage to women as the logical consequences of his doctrine of lib e rty .
Regarding this achievement, Mrs. Fawcett observes*
Like a ll genuine p o litic a l movements, i t has borne fru it
in many measures which are intended to remove the
grievances of 7/h ich thoae who advocate the movement conn
plainj among these collateral results of the agitation
for women’ s suffrage, may be enumerated the Married
Women's Property Act, the Custody of Infants B ill, and
the admission of women to the municipal and educational

^rillicent Garrett Fawcett, Ilia Influence as a Practical Poll*
tic ia n , in "John Stuart Mill, His Mi's and WorfeoT'1Twelve Sketches^1'1
'(Sostont James 1. Osgood and Co., 1873), p. 8lu
9
'■ ".lo 'o e rt S. .tower, John Stuart Mill, in “Social and Political
Ideas of the Age of Reae t.ton an d Sec one kr1’ction,n ed. F, J. C.
Hearnshaw (Hew fork* Barnes and M o b ie , In c ., 19h9), p. 123.
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franchises and to seats upon schoolboards.l
Perhaps the gre atest achievement tfd ch can be attributed to the
Philosophic Radicals, but more particularly to M ill who was th e ir imspirer and leader, was in connection with the Durham Report.

In January

of 1838, M ill began his series of articles in support of Lord IAirham,
who was involved in what was known as the "Canadian Problem*.

He hit*.

self la te r assessed these articles and th eir effe c t, when he relates 1
Lord Durham was b itte rly attacked from a ll sides, inveighed
against by enemies, given up by timid friend aj while those
who would have w illin g ly defended him did not know what he
say* He appeared to be returning a defeated and discred
ited nan. 2
M ill goes on to relate how he had studied the events in Canada from th e ir
inception, and that he had been encouraging his party to carry on with
th eir adopted policy.

He wrote an a rtic le in the Westminster Review, in

which he praised iXirham and his accomplishment, and immediately other
w riters copied his tone.

Soon the "Durham Report" was considered as the

model fo r Canadian and general Colonial policy.

And, as M ill says*

The cause was gained* Lord Durham’s report, w ritten by
Charles Buller, partly under the inspiration of Wake
fie ld , began a new eraj its recommendations, extending
to complete internal self-government, ware in f u ll
operation in Canada within two or three years, and have
been since extended to nearly a ll the other colonies,
of European race, which have any claim to character of
important coiamunities.3

■Hfilllcent Garrett Fawcett, o p .ctt. , p. 85
2
John Stuart M ill, Autobiography, p. 151.
3Ib id .. pp. 151-152.
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M ill’ s own assessment of his role in this matter is confirmed by the
following statement by a c ritic who was otherwise rather severe with
M ill but, in this matter, is his admirer*
One of the greatest things the Philosophical Radicals
did was in the sphere of Colonial reform* They were
v irtu a lly the authors of the new policy of se lfgovernment which saved tie Empire* lord Durham, Charles
Duller, and S ir William Molesworth in Parliament,
E, 0, Wakefield and J. S* M ill outside, a ll laboured
earnestly for the new policy, and they succeeded*
Durham's report oil Canada, w ritten mainly by Duller
and Wakefield, who had been to Canada with him, was
warmly supported by M ill in the London Review, and
this prompt action contributed m aterially to its
success*1
The criticism of Mi l l 's doctrine by Stephen is much milder and
more sympathetic than the c ritic a l material that appeared in the periodic
a l material reviewed in the previous chapter*

But he too finds M ill

fa ilin g to establish his doctrine by sufficient or adequate proof, and
also finds the presentation weakened by the presence of unresolved in 
consistencies*

The criticism in the practical order, however, has been

ch iefly favourable and laudatory,

'Vhatever may be the defects in MiH«s

presentation of his doctrien i t is certain that i t enjoyed a measure of
success in the fie ld of practical p o litic s .

From what has been seen, i t

is obvious that U tilitarian ism , as interpreted and expounded by M ill,
was the underlying Philosophy from which emerged the manifold reforms in
nineteenth century p o lic ia l and social l if e .

I t may have been a case of

where the logical or philosophical defects of a popular leader were more
than overbalanced by his unquestioned sincerity, his personal influence,

"Sower, John Stuart M ill* p, 12li.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

his broad human sympathy, and generous enthusiasm to which p ractically
a ll his c ritic s , even the most vigorous, have fe lt obliged to bear
witness*
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CONCLUSION
In considering the doctrine of lib e rty that was proposed byJohn Stuart M ill, i t was found that a study of his education and back
ground gave souse insight into the for nation of the concept that he pre
sented in his w ritings.

He received m intense education, under the

tutelage of his father, that was prim arily in the tradition of Jerengr
Bentham’ s U tilitarianism , with emphasis on the works of Hobbes, Ricardo,
and Malthus.

An Important influence on his considerations of lib e rty ,

in his early years, was his two v is its to France} the f ir s t introduced
him to the French language, the p o litics of the country, such writers
as Voltaire and his contemporaries, and the companionship of Baptiste
Say and the Saint-Simon group} the second gave him an insight into the
French Revolution and its alms of lib e rty , equality, and fra te rn ity .
His early thought was expressed, as a member of the Philosophic
Radicals, through the Westminster Review.

He came to the point, how

ever, when lie was forced to questioh the principles he had received
from his father, and through the influence of Continental thought he
changed his views radically*

M ill’ s new U tilitarianism admitted of

emotions, and degrees or qualities of pleasure} and he reacted in the
direction of Socialism under the influence of the works of Wordsworth,
Coleridge, Goethe, and. Carlyls.

Thus his views on democracy and lib eral

ism were greatly affected by the Continental ideas of Ms day.
73
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A study of the doctrine of lib e rty , as its appears in M ill’s
w ritings, produced the following results* M ill claimed that there is no
in fa llib le authority that has the right to rule in disagreements of
opinion, that to silence any opinion regardless of its nature is an
assumption of in fa llib ility .

There are, then, only two positions in

the state of lib erty* absolute freedom of discussion or despotism.
This right of free discussion is protected from government interference
by public opinion.

Through discussion of this type, man approaches

certainty by the comparison of opposite opinions? and the certainty
that continues to withstand opposition is called tru th .

False opinions

must be tolerated for the sake of tru th , ard usuallj the opposing
opinions share the truth between them? if an opinion is false, its
in u tility to man w ill cause i t to disappear whereas the true opinion
arises to certainty by withstandrg its opposite over a period of time.
Man has the right to hold diverse opinions only in so fa r as he does
not attempt to impose them on others? the individual has an absolute
right to his own opinion, ri ght or wrong.
In the realm of action,man is free to act as long as he does
not interfere with the rights of the other meubers of society.

lie

should be allowed to establish the pattern of Ms own lif e in order to
atta in virtue? and the greater his eccentricity in the lir h t of accepted
norms, the better it is for the individual concerned and for the society
in which he liv e s .

In ethical questions, the ultimate appeal is to the

standard of u t ility , sine© there is no necessary and objective norm of
m orality.

Liberty therefore, in M ill’ s estimation, is the protection of
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the individual against the tyranny of every other individual in society
In the realm a£ thoughts, words, and acts*
The course o f action taken by those contemporary w riters who
would oppose M ill’ s doctrine in tbs periodical publications, was to
attack the basis of his whole system, the epistemology and the logical
process*

The major criticism of M m 's philosophy, that is repeated by

a ll o f the writers considered in this work, is that he denies the ess*
1st erne of objective and necessary tru th and holds that certitude exists
in the firm and coherent association of ideas which are dependent on the
memory that performs the operation of association*

Too, the c ritic s

point out that M ill w ill not admit of self-evident and permanent moral
axioms outside of the standard of u tility *

The c ritic s , in opposition,

hold th at knowledge is dependent on experience for content, and that i t
is than interpreted in the lig h t of immutable, self-evident truths in
the speculative and practical orders, Issuing in an objective aid un
changing knowledge.

And thgy base th eir code of morality upon the exis

tence of necessary truths bearing divine sanction and represented by
creeds and caramanrimente* In comparing these theories of knowledge and
m orality, the critic s hold that M ill's own theory reduces his declarat
ion to mere opinions which are only valid for their author.
The works of evaluation of iii l l'a contributions in both the
in tellectu al and practical orders are somewhat lauditory In tone.
James Stephen calls M ill's doctrine of freedom an expression of the
relig ion of lib e rty , and he praises i t as able, reasonable, and clear,
lie objects, however, that the essay lacks proof throughout and fa ils to
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establish any of the principles that < *ill proposes.

Stephan finds many

inconsistencies In the doctrine, but he does find and reword a definition
which he claims is the prohibition of the exorcise of foar over the
individual to affect a chansa in hi® actions, except for the sake of self
protection*

He concludes by observing that the power of society over

the Individual must be enlarged beyond the principle of self-protection.
Mrs, Fawcett merely deal® with the applications of Hill’s principles
in the governmental changes he helped to bring about, and finds that he
was successful in affecting a number of reforms in relation to individual
and social freedoms.
Mill’s denial of objective truth and morality res lied in the
asetraptlon that every man is a law unto himself, and that his liberty is
absolute.

This error appears to be the result of the confusion on

Mill* s art of the end of man, and the role of society in aiding man to
attain that end.

The first step, then, in attempting to correct that

error, Is to do what Mill failed to do —

define liberty.

Liberty, in

its proper interpretation, isi
The privilege of creatures endowed with mini or reason)
it is essentially the faculty of being able to choose
between the mean® conducing to th© end, for he who has
the faculty of choosing one thing among mary is master
of his actions, Use possibility of choosing evil is not
of the essence of liberty, it is a defect peculiar to
our liberty.1

^Jacques Mari tain, The Things That Are Not Caesar’s, trans. by
J.F, Scarlan (Hew forks CMHes'T^fener's' Sons, i?3l), r, '-3^«
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And since man is imperfect and nay choose wrongly, his lib e rty must be
guarded by society*

Iran's end is supernatural happiness which, in turn,

is perfect llb s ity ; and in order 'to attain hi® end nan is subject to the
law® of God, to .the authority of the Church in the sp iritu a l realm, and
to the authority of the State on the temporal le v e l.

This authority la

the help that nan needs, that is capable of direction hia acts away fro *
e v il and towards good* SBL11 allowed for no authority capable of dotomdnining what is good and what i® e v il, and he refused to accept any
objective, insautabl© rsoral principle*
Since S ill did not accept the principle of objective truth or
m orality, lie held that ntan m at experiment to progress; and that the
State was Infringing on the individual1® freedom by making laws that
controlled what ho said or how he acted*

But ■'ran lives in society andi

The peculiar end of society, therefore, is not only to
secure respect fo r the Individual lib e rtie s and rights
of every oitlsen, or to ensure material comfort, but
also to procure the tru ly human and therefore moral
good of the social body* Liberty to practice any re li
gion whatsoever in d iffe re n tly (as thought the c iv il power
were under no obligation, to the best of its a b ility
and without claiming any jurisdiction over c neciences,
to Jo homage to tru th ), lib e rty to express any opinion,
lib e rty to print anything, lib e rty to tench any doctrine,
arc a ll, therefore, oven in the eyes of c iv il society,
thin-s contrary to nature.*
An individual in. society mast be aided by that society, which sub

ordinates the temporal to the s p iritu a l, to atta in his fin a l and —
God TTirsce lf*

Society aids man by placing laws, about his

lTM j . , n* U a .
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daftiatimi lib e rty

tm m

m aarth la order th a t he attain a tii#« and

perftoi liberty t§r solioitisgg. B%h# regulative oonirel of tfa» divine

lm t both natural and rw a ltd # and th» adnoatlva nonstw teit of the
tamn State and the fiSbcafOh of ®*rtat»**X
I t rsstaias «hHy to h® « M * to eowMailng loha Stuart M ill*#
olaiaa for lib o ri f of thought* wor4f and aet, "that anob cavers# sorts
of .lib a rtia f (in d lsw lialw te lih srtg ro f thou&fe* w riting* taad&lag*. •
rallglons. uumhSp) em fo r adequate reason be tolerated, provided that
an ajsfnofarlst© operation prevent® %hm team, depw ratlng into license
and disorder#

b b ld ., p , 136.
2TH<t.. p, U S ,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

b

i

b l

i oa a n ?n

PRIMART

SOURCES

M ill, John. Stuart, Autobiograrhy (Saw lorki Columbia University
Press, 192li),
»tA System o f Logie. ftatloelnatlve and Inductive (London*
Longmans, Green and Go,, 1911)*
and

-.Bentham and Coleridge* Introduction by F. R. Leavi#
»*U tilitarianism (London* Longaan*e Careen, and Go*,
6th eET
-—.U tilitarianism , Liberty, and Representative Government
(L o i^ n r^ *1SC 'iient 'anJ'Sbne,' % !^rym ^
Madflnn, Way, J* R, Hainda, and J, McSab i'cCriaiaon, Bibliography
of the Published Writings of John Stuart M ill ( Svaiiston, i l l * i
tiia a ^
'l#»5)♦’ "" ’..rn',,,r'n""

s s n n u 'm

sm m m

A* Books
Artschut*, R« P ., The Philosophy of C 5* B ill (Oxford* The Clarendon
Press, 1953)*
Bain, Alexander, John Stuart M ill, A Criticism with Personal
Recollect iovs' (London* XbniB*m*ar'ffieimTantf Co.* j'B j) .
Chesterton, G ilbert Keith, Victorian km of Literature* (London*
Thornton Butterworth L td ., Y93I) iStW'eT*’’11'"”
Power, Robert S», John Stuart R ytl, in "Social and P o litic a l Ideas
of the Age o f itcacii'on 'nnet Reconstruction", ed* by F.J.C, Hearnehm (Weir fork* Barnes and 'Joble, In c ., 19li9),
79

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

30

Fawcett. M, 0 *. His Influence as a Practical P o litician , in "John
Stuart M ill, Tfi§rX^O1® aW WorS« ' Twelve Sketches* (Boston*
James R. Osgood and Co*, 1873)*
Hayek. F. A** John "tuart M ill and Harriet Taylor (London* Routledge
and K e g a n 'W T E rr B 5T J7------------------ ' ----M aritain, Jacques, The Things That Are. Wot Caesar’s, trans* J* F,
Scanlan (Hew Xor¥* V!&rtee ^ A td o r’ s 'Bom, i'931),
B* Periodical Literature
Anonymous, "M ill On LiVerty". The Dublin Review* X III* New Series
(London* Bums, Oates
'
Anonymous, "Mr* M ill’ s Denial of Necessary Truth," The Dublin Review.
XFII (London* Bums, Dates and Co*, 1871), 285-3W"
Anonymous* "Mr* M ill On The Foundations of M orality". The Dublin
Review* OT1X (London* Burns, Oates and Co., lB72T, V*-16
Bower, Francis, "Mr. H ill and His C ritics," 'Hie American
Presbyterian and Theological Review, (New York* J. M*
M’Coeh, James, "M ill’ s Reply to His C ritics," The American
Presbyterian and Theological Review. X T O T H S T E E T
M ill, John Stuart, "On the Recent Persecution of Persons Vending
Books Against C hristianity, An Address to m ists, by a
Dissenter," The Westminster Review, I I (London* Baldwin,
Credock, and,""3oy7"miV""I«S7------—— ,"0n the Law of Libel and Freedom of the Press," The
Westminster Review, I I I (London* Baldwin, Cradock, an3"""

C. General Histories
Brehior, Bmile, Histoire de la PhiloBophle, VI (Paris* Idbrarie

F elix Alcan,' no' ^ate)'*"
Robinson, Daniel Honrner, An Anthology of Modern Philosophy
(New York * Thomas X. Crowell' Co., 1 9 3 1 ) ' '
" '
T h illy , F ,, A History of Philosophy (®ew fork* Henry Holt, 1?U3)

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Cl
,vbcr.*oPt, P ., A History of Philosophy
Vol. 2.

lo rki Scribners, 1388),

P. General Roferenoee
The Cambridge History of English Literature, ed. by S ir A, W. Ward
C ‘'^ l e r
67 K ' M m m«s Sons, 1917).
The dictionary of National Biography, ed. by S ir Leslie Stephen rnd
& ir' Sidney "Lee' T^nSbnV l^iiard' university ftrest*, 1937)*

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

VITA
famet

Lome Giles Fox
Espanola, Ontario
Hay 23, 1925

Birthdate*

Education!

Primary

S t. Clare Separate School
Windsor, Ontario, 1931-39*

Secondary

S t. Joseph*s High School
Windsor, Ontario, 1939-U3*
Windsor Training and Rehab
ilita tio n In s titu te , 19^6.

University

University of Western Ontario
(Assumption) 19^8-51, 1951-53*

Course

General.

Degree

B.A.

Other Experiences»

June 1951*

Wireless and Electrical Mech
anic in Hie Royal Canadian Air
Force, October 19ii3 - July 19U6.
Supply O fficer in the Royal
Canadian Naval Reserve,
January 1950 to the present.

82

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

